EMU and the Legitimacy of the European Union

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Abstract
The paper analyses the effects of the implementation of EMU on the legitimacy of the European Union. It first considers the nature of the qualitative change in EU policy-making brought about by EMU. Subsequently, it investigates the degree of political legitimacy enjoyed by the European Union and its relationship with the issues of identity and democracy. It shows that the already existing gap between policy-making responsibilities and collective political identification at the EU level has been dramatically increased by EMU. The connection between policy-making, democracy and identity which provides legitimacy at the member-states level has not been reproduced at the EU level contrary to the predictions of diffusion theories which expect new identities to emerge spontaneously as a result of increased interaction. This paper contends that collective political identities are largely constructed by identity-building policies and institutions, notably the education system, which are conspicuously absent at the European Union level. It concludes by arguing that the democratic deficit of the European Union cannot be eliminated solely by institutional reform and that European policy-makers ultimately face a three-option choice: accepting a progressive deterioration of democratic values within the EU, stopping, if not reversing, the process of integration or implementing a policy of European identity-building.

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Introduction

This paper analyses the role of European identity in providing legitimacy to the European Union after the implementation of EMU. It considers the political nature of EMU and it investigates to what extent is the European Union a legitimate political system. It argues that the existing European identity is essentially a non-political one and thus unable to provide legitimacy to the EU policy-making. The very low degree of political identification with the Union after more than four decades of integration shows the failure of what may be called the 'functional-transactionalist' approach to identity creation. The paper contends that such a failure is explained by the fact that collective identifications with political systems are largely constructed by identity-building policies and institutions and that the latter have been absent in the European Union case. It concludes by arguing that the democratic deficit of the EU cannot be eliminated solely by institutional reform and that the European policy-makers face a stark choice between adopting an explicit policy of identity building or accepting a progressive deterioration of democratic legitimacy within the EU.

1 The political significance of EMU

The political nature of EMU can be interpreted in two radically different ways. Followers of the first school of thought believe that EMU does not represent a significant qualitative change in the political complexion of the EU and it will not lead to its transformation into a federal state. They point to the following factors. First, EMU can be seen as just another step in a long sequence of 'functional' integrative moves by the European states, which nonetheless have not deprived them of their independence and sovereignty. These moves have brought about a pooling of decision-making in areas where it was necessary for economic reasons. "High politics" areas have been consistently left out of this process. Second, monetary policy is no longer central to political decision-making and currencies have ceased to be fundamental attributes of state sovereignty. They argue that over the last twenty years of so monetary policy has undergone a process of de-politicisation marked by the rise of the doctrine of central bank independence, the adoption of so-called 'currency boards' and the more recent debate on 'dollarisation'. In many ways, the creation of a single European currency managed by a politically independent central bank constitutes the culmination of this trend. Following this line of thought, 'functionalist' commentators have argued that the euro will not represent a dramatic step towards the demise of national

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1 The most articulate formulation of this view of integration is the 'liberal intergovernmentalism' theory, see Moravcsik (1993).
sovereignties since monetary policy has been integrated at the European level precisely because it was already detached from the ‘hard core’ of sovereignty\(^3\).

However, there are several reasons why this paper shares the opposite view, namely that EMU is a very significant step towards the transformation of the European Union from an economic confederation into a fully-fledged political confederation and possibly even towards federal structures. Above all, the sceptic argument overlooks the very crucial fact that if monetary policy has been de-politicised it has by no means ceased to be linked with other sectors of economic policy. The nascent debate over co-ordination of fiscal policies and tax harmonisation shows that monetary policy has not lost its political salience, even though the latter may be more indirect than in the past\(^4\). Indeed, EMU is very likely to trigger wide-ranging spillover dynamics far beyond monetary policy such as reform of the labour markets and a possible centralisation at the European level of fiscal capacity\(^5\). More generally, monetary integration in Europe has never been a purely economic matter but has always had a very strong political profile as the start rather than the end of the process of deeper political integration. It is also worth bearing in mind that the degree of monetary ‘sovereignty’ forgone by the European countries, most notably Germany, was far greater than the one involved in the hypothetical dollarisation of Argentina. This is very hard to explain within a purely ‘functional’ logic without acknowledging the overwhelming political character of the process. Last but not least, EMU is qualitatively different from the other ‘functional’ steps of the past in that it confers competence on monetary policy to a truly supranational body such as the ECB over which the influence of the member states is extremely limited. For all this reasons, this paper assumes that EMU represent a major step towards the federalisation of the EU and it thus raises very important legitimacy questions.

\(^2\) For an overview of the rise of central banks' independence see *The Economist* (1998); on dollarisation, i.e. the adoption of the US dollar as official currency by another state, see Warn and Fidler (1999) and *The Economist* (1999b).

\(^3\) See Currie et al. (1999) and Brittan (1999).

\(^4\) See Alesina and Wacziarg (1999: 12).

\(^5\) For an overview of the likely political consequences of EMU see McKay (1999).
II Legitimacy and identity in the EU

The concept of legitimacy of a political system is a complex one. This section focuses on one of its aspects: the role of a collective political identity shared by both rulers and ruled. Following Beetham (1991: 69), this paper considers it the central aspect of the notion of legitimacy because by providing a shared set of values, beliefs and feelings it is crucial in making the exercise of power legitimate. Political identities, in turn, are embedded in wider and deeper cultural identifications, a more general ‘we-feeling’\(^6\). The existence of a shared political identity essentially satisfies two needs. First, it justifies the rules according to which power is acquired and exercised in a society. Second, it satisfies citizens’ need to belong to, and to identify with, a political system, thus enabling them to perceive a direct connection between one’s own values and preferences and the public ones. This feeling of identification and belonging is the only one able to provide ‘affective’ or ‘diffuse’ support for a political system as opposed to ‘utilitarian’ or ‘specific’ support whose loyalty is correlated with material benefits\(^7\). Furthermore, identification with a political system implies a sense of loyalty to that polity, i.e. a feeling of moral obligation to pursue the collective interests of those belonging to that system vis-à-vis potentially conflicting interests of other political systems.

In order for a political system to enjoy legitimacy, there must be a strong connection between the degree of political identification with the system and the latter’s policy-making prerogatives. This is the mechanism in operation at the member states level where their policy-making powers are closely matched by a primary political identification with the state and a wider primary cultural identification with the nation. Where this is not the case, the legitimacy of the national state is in question.

Is the same mechanism in operation at the European level? As the EU is acquiring more and more competencies that used to belong to the inner core of the modern European national state we would need the presence of strong cultural and political identification with the EU to reproduce at the European level the national state model.

Given the existence of strong national identities in the EU, much of the hope of creating a European political identity stems from the concept of multiple identities which has been discussed at a theoretical level in the literature and of which several national states provide

\(^6\) On the connection between cultural and political identity see, among others, Deutsch et al. (1957: 36) and Moxon-Browne (1997: 33).
\(^7\) On the difference between affective and utilitarian support see Niedermayer and Westle (1995); on the relations between types of support and loyalty see Herz (1978: 318); Melich (1986: 149) and Obradovic (1996: 209)
empirical evidence. In this sense, the hope is to juxtapose a European 'layer' of political identity to the existing national ones. However, since political identification involve loyalty and feelings of obligation, multiple 'layers' of political identity have to structure themselves on a hierarchical order rather than on a horizontal one. If a conflict between the interests of two levels of the political system arise, political actors must ultimately decide to which one they are to be loyal. It goes without saying that within the EU political system potential for conflicts between the European interest and one or more national interests is always present. The issue of ultimate loyalty shows that one among multiple political identities must necessarily enjoy supremacy over the others. In terms of legitimacy, then, it follows that primary layers of policy-making should coincide with primary layers of political identity.

To make it easier to conceptualise this connection in the European case, the table below provides a matrix of how these should connect under different forms of the EU political system if the latter is to enjoy a sustainable level of legitimacy.

| Identities and policy-making under selected models of the EU political system |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                             | 1   | 2            | 3            | 4            |
| EU level                   | *   | -            | */**         | **           |
| State level                | *** | ***          | ***          | ***          |
| Region level               | **  | *            | *            | *            |

Key: Numbers represent types of political systems, 1: federal/regional state in intergovernmental EU, 2: federal/regional state in supranational EU (confederation), 3: EU plurinational federation (federation of nations), 4: EU uninational federation (united states of Europe). Stars represent relative importance of layers, ***: primary, **: secondary, *: tertiary. Ci stands for cultural identity, Pi stands for political identity, Pm for policy-making responsibilities.

Under the first type of system, which roughly describes the nature of the European Community in the 60s and 70s, it is shown that the absence of a European political identity does not fundamentally undermine the legitimacy of the system because the policy-making responsibilities of the European level are very limited and because a degree of cultural identity is assumed to be there as a pre-requisite of the establishment of an organisation such as the European Community. This situation has been described in the literature as

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8 On the co-existence of multiple identities see Smith (1981: 383; 1993: 133); the UK and Spain are well known European cases of states where multiple identities coexist.
9 In this respect, I do not share Lodge's critique of the functionalist concept of 'loyalty transfer', see Lodge (1978).
10 A clear example of conflict between loyalty to the European commonwealth and to a national one is provided by Baldwin when he argued, with reference to the Spanish approach to structural funds expenditure, that "Iberian politicians would have acted irresponsibly if they had not used their Council position to improve the welfare of the people that elected them" (1994: 180).
'permissive consensus', i.e. a generally favourable disposition towards efforts to integrate the western European countries without reference to specific policy-making competences.\textsuperscript{11}

Under the second model, which tries to capture the present situation, the EU has dramatically increased its policy-making responsibilities and its supra-national character. Today's European Union is thus a peculiar form of confederation which is moving away from its previously overwhelming economic character towards a more fully-fledged political one and it is also adopting more federal structures. In terms of policy-making, its competences, though still inferior to the state level, are now extremely important. In order to be legitimate, these policy-making responsibilities need to be supported by a greatly increased strength of the European 'layer' of identity. As the table above shows, this implies raising the degree of identification with the EU to a level of a major political identity second only to national identities.

If the political interpretation of EMU argued in the previous section is correct, then in terms of our matrix the EU will move from the current second model to the third one. This would require another significant leap in the strength of the European 'layer' of identity to make that form of EU political system legitimate. The European layer of policy-making would become the most important one and, accordingly, the European layer of political identity should become the primary one. This is so because a federation requires the ultimate loyalty of the citizens to be directed to the federal level of the polity. As discussed above, citizens' ultimate loyalty is directed to the level of the political system to which they primarily identify. Under the present form of the EU this is the national state, under a legitimate form of European federation this would have to be the federal level. In summary, the EU policy prerogatives fall at present in the second model of the table but tend to move towards the third model. Does the existing level of European political identity match its expected level according to the matrix above? The available attitudinal and behavioural data depict a rather contradictory picture.

On the one hand, 54% of the EU citizens identify primarily or secondarily with Europe [fig. 1] and 53% of them feel Europe 'close'.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, 54% support the establishment of a

\textsuperscript{11} On the concept of 'permissive consensus' see Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 38-63; 249-78); see also Hix (1999: 134-5).

\textsuperscript{12} The first datum is from European Commission (1998: 59) the second from Green (1999: 25).
European government accountable to the European parliament and 45% are in favour of the transformation of the EU into a federal state\textsuperscript{13}. 

On the other hand, only 36% of them support the existence of the EU [fig. 2] and only 49% of the electorate voted in the last elections for the European Parliament as opposed to an average of 71% in the last two national elections of the four largest member states [fig. 3]\textsuperscript{14}. Also, they trust fellow EU citizens of other countries much less (+25) than fellow nationals (+73) and no more than US citizens (+27) [fig. 4] and only 38% of them think the Europeans share a cultural identity\textsuperscript{15}.

How are we to explain the contradiction between these data? Providing a conclusive answer is beyond the scope of this paper but at least three elements seem to emerge. First the Europeans identify quite strongly with Europe where this is perceived in somewhat vague terms. If Europe is defined more strictly in cultural terms as a European culture or in political terms as the European Union, the degree of identification is much lower. It seems therefore that there is a significant degree of European identity but this is essentially neither a cultural nor a political identity but what could be termed an 'attitudinal' identity. The data on a European government and a federal Europe appear to run counter this interpretation as they refer to purely political issues. I would argue that this is not actually the case as those figures refer to hypothetical future developments of the EU rather than to its current reality as opposed to the other 'political' data. At a cognitive level, thus, those two data are in the same category of the datum in favour of the unification of Western Europe, historically very high\textsuperscript{16}, but which has nonetheless coexisted with the other 'negative' data for a long time.

This interpretation would also confirm findings of previous research which have shown that the European identity is frequently opposed to a localistic identity rather than to a national identity. In other words, the fundamental dichotomy is between cosmopolitan and parochial identities rather than between the latter and national identity\textsuperscript{17}. This seems to show that

\textsuperscript{13} 24% are opposed to a European government and 22% don't know, 15% are opposed to the federalisation of the EU and 40% don't know; data are from European Commission (1996a: 29-30 and (1995), respectively
\textsuperscript{14} The first datum is the percentage of people who would be 'very sorry' if the EU were scrapped and is for the EU citizens living in the nine members that made up the EC in the period 1973-1981 therefore is not comparable with the other data, see European Commission (1998: 37). The figure for national elections is calculated from data in Wattenberg (1998).
\textsuperscript{15} The figures on trust are calculated from data in European Commission (1996a: 41-4), the index is the result of percentages of respondents who trust minus percentages of respondents who do not. The figure on cultural identity is from European Commission (1998: 60)
\textsuperscript{16} Between 70 and 80% in the last two decades, see European Commission (1996b: 1).
increased interactions do have an influence on people's identity but have a very limited effect on that particular form of identity that is the identification with a political system.

If this is so, then in terms of our matrix the European Union's policy responsibilities are moving from model two to model three while the degree of political identification that it commands is still at the model one stage, i.e. very much embryonic\textsuperscript{18}. In other words, the European Union is already facing a substantial legitimacy deficit and this is poised to deepen dramatically in the not too distant future. The problems encountered during the ratification process of the Maastricht treaty could then be seen as just a forewarning. This aspect of the legitimacy deficit receives less attention both at the academic and at the public opinion levels than the 'democratic' or institutional aspect of it, but it logically precedes it and it is arguably more difficult to resolve. The debate on the legitimacy deficit tend to focus on the institutional mechanism of representation and accountability of the EU not paying enough attention to the fact that the existence of a collective territorial political identity shared by both rulers and ruled is the basic legitimizing foundation of democratic political systems\textsuperscript{19}.

The operations of the European Central Bank (ECB) exemplify very clearly the scale of the conflict between policy-making and identity in the EU. This takes place on two levels. On the first one, the Governing Council is required to pursue the European interest regardless of the degree this may be in conflict with one or more national ones. In the event of such a situation there would arise a conflict of 'ultimate loyalties' between the six 'supranational' members of the Executive Board and the eleven 'national' governors of the states' central banks. The latter will still be under the obligation to pursue the national interest because their primary political identity is the national one. On the second one, there is a permanent legitimacy tension between the EU citizens whose loyalty goes to the national states and the ECB as a whole, which is only loyal to the European commonwealth. Whenever the ECB takes a decision which is not in the best interest of a given national state, that decision will not be legitimate for the citizens of that state. Hence, the problem of legitimacy of the ECB just magnifies the legitimacy problem of the EU as a whole as its officials seem to be aware\textsuperscript{20}.

\textsuperscript{18} William Wallace (1999: 521) has expressed a similar concept in the following words: "The central paradox of the European political system in the 1990s is that governance is becoming increasingly a multi-level, intricately institutionalized activity, while representation, loyalty and identity remain stubbornly rooted in the traditional institutions of the nation state".

\textsuperscript{19} See Beetham and Lord (1999: 33).

\textsuperscript{20} The ECB president Wim Duisenberg declared that "perhaps the most important challenge for the ECB is to win the confidence of the citizens of Europe" (\textit{The Wall Street Journal Europe} 1998: 13);
III The failure of the functional-transactionalist approach

The policy-makers' approach to the issue of European political identity that has prevailed so far can be defined as 'functional-transactionalist'. In its essence it expected such an identity to emerge more or less spontaneously as interactions among Europeans would grow with the growth of functional integration. Its roots can be traced back to the idea of the "solidarité de fait" mentioned by Robert Schuman in his declaration of May 1950\(^\text{21}\) and to the functionalist ideas that inspired it. It has since claimed its intellectual pedigree from the 'transactionalist' and neo-functionalist theories of integration\(^\text{22}\). On the assumption that European integration together with modernisation and, more recently, with globalisation would have enormously increased the interactions and social communications among Europeans\(^\text{23}\), they expected a European political identity to emerge as a by-product of the overall process.

However, this paper contends that this intellectual claim has been based on a misinterpretation of the two early theories of integration. The initiator of neo-functionalism, Ernst Haas, predicted that as functional integration would progress, political actors would be "persuaded to shift their loyalties" towards a "new political community" (1958: 16). Since, as discussed above, loyalty comes with political identification, he predicted that political actors in Europe would shift their primary political identification from the national states to the European Community/Union. But a crucial aspect to be borne in mind is that by 'political actors' Haas and the other neo-functionalists referred to the political, bureaucratic and non-governmental elites and not to the general public. Indeed, neo-functionalism's neglect of mass opinion has been one of the chief criticisms brought against the original formulation of the theory\(^\text{24}\). As regards Deutsch, he did put much emphasis in his works on the crucial importance of a high level of communication in sustaining processes of integration and on the role of increased interactions in bringing such level of communications about. However,

\(^{21}\) The most famous sentence of the declaration reads: "l'Europe ne se fera pas d'un coup ni dans un construction d'ensemble; elle se fera par des réalisations concrètes creant d'abord une solidarité de fait".

\(^{22}\) For transactionalism see Deutsch et al. (1957); for neo-functionalism see Haas (1958)

\(^{23}\) The idea that modern conditions are more propitious to processes of integration and to the emergence of supranational identity is a widely held one and has been recently re-affirmed by Smith (1993: 132); however Deutsch himself was highly sceptical towards it and wrote that "the closer we get to modern conditions and to our own time, the more difficult it is to find any instances of successful amalgamation of two or more previously sovereign states" (1957: 22).

\(^{24}\) On this point see Sinnott (1995: 19-23).
he also stressed that communication was a "background condition" to a more formal and institutionalised process of integration rather than the essence of the process in itself\textsuperscript{25}. 

It is remarkable to note that while these early theories of integration have lost much following, their popularised mis-interpretation with regards to European political identity are still surprisingly resilient in both the academic and the public opinion debates\textsuperscript{26}. As a result, the overall approach to the issue of European political identity by the member states and by the European institutions themselves continues to be characterised essentially by neglect. Only rarely has the issue been explicitly addressed and even then in the face of much reluctance from the member states\textsuperscript{27}. It could be argued that this approach has prevailed because it offered a 'soft' way of creating a European political identity compared to more direct methods which would have been likely to provoke a backlash from national governments. Beetham and Lord \textsc{(1999: 57)} have suggested that through the prominent participation of their governments in the decision-making of the EU, member states have also tried to transfer to the latter the legitimacy enjoyed by national institutions. However, this seems to have worked, at best, only one way. Member states have been quick to take the pride for EU decisions that were popular with the electorate while blaming the 'Brussels bureaucrats' for any unpopular decision. Above all, as Wallace \textsc{(1999: 506)} wrote, this blurring of roles and responsibilities between the EU and the national governments' level has created an "inherently untidy and inefficient system, built on sustaining the illusion that governments themselves provide their voters with benefits...which can in practice be won only through common action with others", which clearly does not help in generating political identification with the Union.

In sum, the strategy delineated above has conspicuously failed in achieving its objective. Despite the enormous increase in interactions and communications among Europeans\textsuperscript{28}, the degree of citizens' political identification with the EU has not grown commensurably with the growth of EU policy-making prerogatives and it is now plainly inadequate to legitimise the latter. The European may have become much more cosmopolitan and much less parochial

\textsuperscript{25} A "multiplicity of ranges of social communication and transactions was a background condition for amalgamation", see Deutsch et al. \textsc{(1957: 70)}.

\textsuperscript{26} For the former see, among others, Howe \textsc{(1995: 34)} and Smith \textsc{(1993: 134)}; for the latter see for example Leonard \textsc{(1998: 27)} and \textit{The Economist} \textsc{(1999a)}.

\textsuperscript{27} The two most significant attempts took place in 1975 with the Tindemans committee on EC reform and in 1985 when the Adonnino committee presented its report on a 'People's Europe' recommending adoption of symbols that would strengthen citizens' political identification with the European Community/Union, see Wintle \textsc{(1996: 9-24)} and \textit{A People's Europe}.

\textsuperscript{28} It is also worth considering that some 'cultural' transactions have not increased much, for example only 9\% of French speak German and only 11\% of Germans speak French, see European Commission \textsc{(1998: 111)}.
but they still identify politically to an almost exclusive extent with their national states. The enduring strength of political identities at the national level contrasted to the failure to emerge of identification with the European level lends support to the argument that such identities do not spontaneously emerge but need to be built through policies and institutions\textsuperscript{29}. More specifically, the experience of the national states shows that the central element of any process of identity building is the use of the education system in its role of political socialiser.

In this respect the situation of the EU is radically different from those of the member states. Of course, there is no pan-EU education system which could be used to socialise citizens into a political identification with the Union. Nor the EU has much competence on the policies of the member states; indeed of all policy-making responsibilities acquired by the European Union, the weakest are those covering the two most important vehicles of identity building: education and culture\textsuperscript{30}. At the member states’ level, the European dimension of education curricula is virtually non-existent, for example there is no EU ‘civics’ in secondary school\textsuperscript{31}. It thus follows that the European dimension of political socialisation is almost non-existent compared to the national dimensions, which in turn is a major cause of the absence of a proper space of political debate at the EU level\textsuperscript{32}.

In the light of what precedes, it clearly emerges that a change of education policy at the member states’ level promise to be the only way to break the current vicious circle between integration and legitimacy by which each new integrative step aggravate the legitimacy deficit of the EU. National governments, being at the same time the chief promoters of deeper integration and the authorities responsible for education policy bear the burden to do so if they are serious about democratising the EU\textsuperscript{33}. Given the different time-scale between policy allocation and identity building, this is also an urgent task. As the recent history of integration has shown, fifteen years can be long enough to radically change the nature of a political system but are a very short period for building political identification among the

\textsuperscript{29} This argument has been advanced by many in relation to the creation of national states, see in particular Hobsbawn (1990) and Weber (1977); it is also remarkable how distinctive East Germans’ political identity became in just forty years as shown by its resilience after the reunification.

\textsuperscript{30} For a quick overview of the policy responsibilities of the EU see table in Alesina and Wacziarg (1999: 37).

\textsuperscript{31} See Green (1999: 12).

\textsuperscript{32} Of the 23 leading newspapers in the EU, for example, none has a section for EU-countries news separate from other international news and only four have a European section, which however covers EU and non-EU countries, while all have a separate section for national news [see app. 2].

\textsuperscript{33} Beetham and Lord (1999: 40) have made a similar point: “the hypothesis that governments can displace the satisfaction of key needs into the Union, while retaining a monopoly of identity at national level, simply will not do”; see also ibidem (41).
general population and not only the elites. Last but not least, such a change of policy would enjoy the overwhelming support of the EU citizens: in the last four years over 80 per cent of Europeans supported an EU dimension of the education curricula.

Conclusions

The implementation of EMU has dramatically increased the policy-making prerogatives of the EU level and has moved the entire political system of the European Union closer to federal forms. At the same time, the degree of European political identity has remained stubbornly low thus creating a very significant legitimacy deficit. Citizens' participation in the process of integration and their feelings of belonging to the emergent political system are crucial to the latter's chances of success. The neglect towards the issue of political identification with the EU is increasingly unsustainable and the national governments bear the responsibility to ensure that the political system they are creating be a legitimate one according to the principles of democratic legitimacy.

This is why they should use their exclusive control over the education systems that socialise European citizens' to raise their political identification with the Union. Should they continue to ignore the growing legitimacy deficit of the EU, two scenarios seem then to emerge: either the citizens will sooner or later react against the EU system in a Maastricht-style crisis writ large or there will be a continuous erosion of democracy as we know it within Europe.

Acknowledgements

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34 We do not have data on political identification with the EU at the elite level but it is likely to be significantly higher than among the general public, cf. note 22.
35 In the period 1995-1999 an average of 85 per cent supported "teaching in schools how the EU works", which is arguably the best available estimator of support for an EU dimension in education, see European Commission (1998: 58 and 1999: 57).
36 In their study on historical examples of integration, Deutsch et al. (1957: 104) found that "popular participation in the amalgamation movement" was the most decisive method to secure the success of the process.
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Appendix 1

Fig. 1

**European identity**

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Source: Eurobarometer 50 and 12

Fig. 2

**Support index**

Source: Eurobarometer 50

Fig. 3

**EP elections turnout**

Source: Eurobarometer 51
Fig. 4

Trust Index

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Source: Eurobarometer 46
Appendix 2

ABC
Corriere della Sera
The Daily Telegraph
Les Echos
Le Figaro
*Financial Times
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Frankfurter Rundschau
Il Giornale
The Guardian
*Handelsblatt
The Independent
Liberation
Le Monde
*El Mundo
El Pais
La Repubblica
Le Soir
Il Sole 24 Ore
La Stampa
Süddeutsche Zeitung
The Times
*Die Welt

key: * (with a Europe section)