Report on the
CODEP Conference 2002

Exclusion and Identity:
The Politics of Rights, Race and Religion
21st Century Trends in War and Peace – Experience and Responses

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## CODEP Conference 2002

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CODEP Conference 2002

Executive summary

The Conflict, Development and Peace network (CODEP) holds a major conference every year to promote learning, debate and networking around key issues relating to conflict, peace and development. This year the conference, titled “Exclusion and Identity: The Politics of Rights, Race and Religion” focused on the connections between identity and exclusion and the role they play in conflicts around the world. The topic of the conference was inspired by the recent events which have seen an extraordinary recrudescence of conflict from last year’s terrorist attacks in the US to the Bradford riots in the UK, the escalating violence in the Middle East and in the Kashmir dispute.

In particular, the conference addressed the consequences of the adoption of the “if you are not with us you are against us” frame of thought in the so-called war on terrorism and in the much of international relations over the last year. What are the implications of this for the global realignment. What are the implications for the multiplicity of identities, needs, viewpoints, opinions and experiences around the world in conflict situations. The conferences explored what is the impact of this new frame of thought on the work we do in the field of conflict reduction, development and humanitarian aid. As in previous occasions, the 2002 conference brought together human rights advocates, NGO representatives, journalists, academics, humanitarian and development workers from various parts of the world blending personal experiences and case studies in a global perspective. It thus offered them the opportunity to explore convergences and differences in their approaches so as to improve our collective capacity to understand and to act in our efforts towards the goals of peace and just development.

These issues were addressed in keynote speeches by renowned experts on identity, exclusion and conflict and further discussed in a series of workshops with full audience participation. The keynote addressed focused on identity and conflict in Palestine, Kashmir, Northern Ireland, Aceh and on the overall security context in the early XXI century. A first series of workshops discussed the following: the concept and the dynamics of state failure; the interplay between identity and violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the political uses of religion; the civilian option in humanitarian interventions; the role of diaspora groups; the connections between economic and social aspects of conflict situations; the dynamics and the determinants of ethnic cleansing; the role of the media and the issue of cultural sensitivity in charity work. A second series of workshops provided a comparative overview of the exclusion/inclusion dichotomy in five crucial areas of the world: Africa; the Balkans and the CIS; India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; Latin America and Indonesia.

In deliberate contrast to the rhetoric of war the Network also introduced a major innovation of this conference: the ‘peace cabinet’, a group of three people observing discussion, taking notes and reflecting on the proceedings. It was intended to borrow the notion and the methods of ‘war cabinets’ and turned them towards discussing ways of achieving peace. For the first time, the conference went beyond traditional categories and included artistic performances in its workshops.
Keynote Addresses

Exclusion and Identity in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Laila Atshan, a Palestinian consultant on psycho-social issues related to identity and conflict opened the conference with a keynote speech addressing the conference’s themes through the lenses of her personal experience living in Palestine.

Atshan started her talk by recalling how difficult it had been for her to get to the conference. She lives in Ramallah which is under curfew and subjected to the so-called ‘sweeping’ – i.e. detailed searches routinely violating people’s privacy – by the Israeli security forces. Under such circumstances she could not legally leave to attend the conference. During one of these sweepings, 15 Israeli soldiers entered her flat at 3:30 am on the night before she was due to leave for the UK. The Israeli soldiers arrested a few young men, put pillow cases on their heads, made them kneel down and literally pushed them down the stairs. The following morning with the help of an ambulance-driver friend she managed to ‘escape’ from Ramallah and take a flight.

Identity and exclusion in an English boarding school

Atshan first became aware of identity and exclusion when she attended an English boarding school for the blind. That experience reminds her of being a Palestinian today. Pupils were not allowed to speak Arabic during the week; they could only do so on Sundays. It was compulsory to attend Christian religious services. Students were not encouraged to be proud about being Arab. She felt that they were trying to take her identity. The school building had two wings connected by a corridor. The girls were not allowed to cross the corridor and had to use the stairs to go from one wing of the building to the other. Students felt very isolated in that school and many never completed their studies. The only time she fastened for the Ramadan was during her stay at that school, she did it to prove a point. Elite pressure forces people to become religious even if that would not be their choice. When people are confronted with alien power and authority they take refuge in their religion and identity. It is a way of seeking refuge.

Identity and exclusion in today’s Palestine

This is a dynamic very much present in today’s West Bank and Gaza strip. Palestinians are divided into so-called ‘cantons’ and are confined there; they feel like living in cages. People cannot go to their work, teachers cannot go to their schools, people cannot go to their hospitals and people employed in Israel have been laid off. There are many restrictions on movement and check-points between cantons. Atshan witnessed hundreds of cases of Palestinians being subjected to systematic humiliation by the Israeli forces. For instance, men are forced to strip and their clothes are burned and women are forced to take their veil off. Over the last two years Israeli have been targeting Palestinian identity, they want to destroy
Palestinian identity and destroying identity is a form of genocide. How difficult it is to walk around and not feeling comfortable about who you are.

**Identity and communication**

Palestinians feel that their voice is not heard. Atshan recalled a conversation she once had with an employee of the Israeli embassy in Nigeria. The man spoke about his life in Nigeria and the fact that he always needs an escort. This he attributed to the fact that Nigerians are very poor, resources and power are concentrated in a tiny elite and popular anger translates into crimes and violence. But when she drew a parallel with Palestine and argued that the elite in Nigeria are very much in the same position as settlers in the West Bank, the man angrily rejected the comparison. This story shows how difficult it is to see truth when it conflict with our own identity, fears and beliefs. Atshan also mentioned the relationship between Palestinians refugees in Denmark, mostly intifada injured youths, and the authorities. They are willing to help the refugees but they have a patronising attitude, they want to tell refugees “what to do”, “what's best for them” in a very similar way to the way people relate to the blind. There is very much a ‘superior-inferior’ relationship. Refugees in Denmark also emphasise their religion as a defence against the perception of exclusion from the host society. This has little to do with religion as a spiritual experience it is primarily an identity reaction.

**“They did learn them from the Nazis”**

Atshan argued that the Israeli learned their methods of oppression from the Nazis, though most people find this difficult to accept. She pointed out that there are so many similarities between the behaviour of the Nazis in occupied Europe and that of the Israeli forces in the occupied territories of Palestine, in particular as regards Nazi plans for the Jews and the Israeli plans for the Palestinians, to put them into ‘bantustans’ and to call them ‘autonomous regions’. She could see the same desire for an ethnically pure state, the same attempt at de-humanising the ‘other’. Most Israelis make use of the Holocaust sense of guilt to get away with what they do and to shut people up; the new generation is rather insensitive towards being called Nazi. Israelis are using the victim complex to get away with their actions in the same way disabled people use their handicaps, as she learned while working with the intifada injured children and their families between 1991-1996. This is a psychological cycle which leads people who have been abused to abuse others unless the cycle is stopped by some form of healing.

**“Why?...what’s happening?”**

This everyday experience of humiliation and discrimination suffered by the Palestinians clashes with the widespread discourse on peace, development and democracy. It seems that the more we speak the worse it is getting. People always speak about democracy and development and the gap with reality is growing wider and wider. The same pattern of domination and denial of identity that she experienced in the boarding school are replicated in the behaviour of the Israelis towards the Palestinians and the Americans towards the rest of the world. What
people experience every day is greed for power and resources, not democracy and development. They ask themselves “why?”, “what’s happening?”, why is there such a gap between public talks and the reality we live in? We need to reassess our values, not just in an intellectual way. People see democracy proclaimed but they demand it in practice. In contrast, they face double standards and they react against this. Many people in the Third World have come to hate the word democracy, because they feel the big powers pay lip service to the idea of democracy and they betray it every day in their actions. Where all this will stop? People can only take so much.

“We can make a difference”.

All of us, as human beings, share the responsibility for what happens in the world. We must avoid becoming like diplomats, we should go beyond our “brief” and make a difference. Diplomats are disempowered in this conflict, they stick to the brief, are prisoners of their status and they overlook issues of human rights. We have a responsibility to tackle this. If we are comfortable in what we think we can handle it. Do not keep your feelings and your indignation to yourself, act on it and do something positive. Spread the message beyond small groups of like-minded people, go and mobilise others. Unity is strength, when you have a friend by your side you feel more secure. Togetherness and friendship can empower people, we do need each other to feel empowered and challenge oppression and injustice. She finally drew a distinction between knowing and understanding. We can only understand something by relating to it. We all have a personal example to relate to what is happening in the world and it is important to act on it. This is very much what her personal experience has taught her. After all, it is the majority of people who are marginalised so “why are we underestimating the power which is in our great numbers?”

Discussion

Shazadi Beg, a British lawyer specialising in adjudication and asylum appeals: The politics of rights, race and religion reached the top of the agenda everywhere. Last year’s terrorist attacks in the US were seen by the Americans as an attack on freedom and by many others as the explosion of all the simmering injustices of the world. The paradox is that the rising of the tide against Islamic extremism takes place side to side with the rise of extremist political agendas in the civilised world. The FN in France and the BNP in Britain are European examples but the phenomenon is not confined to Europe as the case of the BJP in India indicates. Rising extremism in India continues to be tolerated by the international community. As is the conflict in Kashmir, which has only attracted attention with the risk of nuclear war but that has claimed the lives of 75,000 civilians in the last decade alone as well as gross human rights violations. Despite this there is no international monitoring of the situation.

The UN urgently needs to take a stand on a definition of terrorism. Terrorism has become the major issue now. The world needs to differentiate between terrorism and freedom struggles. Some countries are exploiting the terrorism issue to forward
their political agenda. In this light state response to quash freedom struggles should be classified for what it is, i.e. state terrorism. Israeli PM Sharon is a man responsible for massacres but the international community has not taken him to task. In the occupied territories the Israeli settlers have an overwhelmingly disproportionate control of the water supply. The history of the intifada tells an important lesson in conflict transformation. Unemployed and angry young men are dangerous in any society. But where they do not have anything but oppression and violence, martyrdom becomes an acceptable option. Israel declared that its patience is running out with terrorism but Israel has been conducting terrorism on Palestinian lands for three generations now.

The failure of the international community can be understood as the result of a growing mismatch between the existing problems and the available responses. There is a gap between rhetoric on aid and reality. The 1990s saw a further erosion of humanitarian values through the growing involvement of the military in relief operations. This was initially welcomed but it was later on realised that with the military also came the narrow political interests of the states mobilising them. Humanitarian aspects take second place to the pursuit of national interests. When conflicts occur it is always the civilians who pay the ultimate price.

Even before the September 2001 terrorist attacks the foreign policy doctrine of the rich states held that intervention in other countries’ affairs was only acceptable to pursue national political and economic interests. The US quickly forgot Russian human rights violations in Chechnya. Double standards and selective approach to the defence of human rights are evident. For instance, UN non-action vis-à-vis the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. At the root of the problems with humanitarian intervention there is problem with the organisational weaknesses of the UN. The international community talks about democracy then ignores it, it talks about the UN and then it ignores the resolutions.

Religion is clearly a key ingredient of conflict. In almost all cases of today’s conflict the oppressed populations are Muslim. But no passage of the Koran incites to violence. It is a mistake to place all Islamic states under one banner. In many Islamic states the mosque is the place where politics is discussed because there is no other way to voice dissent. In many cases Islamist organisations have gained legitimacy by providing humanitarian assistance. The Islamic world must feel under siege. The West and the US in particular must wake up to the new political reality, foreign policy is now domestic politics.

Other issues identified:

- Role of the media in providing balanced reporting
- Greater sensitivity towards humiliations rather than purely physical violence
Global Security in the Twenty-First Century

Paul Rogers, professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University, analysed trends in global security in the near future and the impact of last year’s events on their likely development. He warned that unless Western countries radically change their approach to security the world will see a recrudescence of conflict in the future. He concluded arguing that civil society – especially academics and practitioners – have a crucial role in determining change in foreign policy.

Definitions of terrorism

He began his talk challenging the notion that terrorism is conducted by non-state actors. Not only can terrorism be also state-led but most terrorism is actually conducted by states against their own populations. Last year’s terrorist attacks in the US are widely regarded as unique, but mass-casualty political violence was a common aspect of state control throughout the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, the use of state terror continues in many parts of the world, including in countries that maintain support from western democracies. In the future it will be the interaction between the use of terror by state actors and by anti-state and anti-elite actors which will be most significant.

Trends in international (in)security

Paul Rogers identified three main drivers of conflict and insecurity over the next few decades: socio-economic divisions, environmental constraints and proliferation of military technology. Socio-economic divisions have steadily grown over the last three decades creating a deep divide between an elite of about one billion people and a mass of the remaining five billion people. The ratio of global inequality between the richest and poorest fifths of the world population nearly doubled in the last twenty years. Though the elite lives primarily in Western Europe and North America there are significant elites in poor countries and marginalised minorities within rich societies. The trend is towards a transnationalisation of these social stratifications, especially towards creating a global elite. Meanwhile, rising levels of education and exposure to mass communication in the poor countries creates a generation of “knowledgeable poor”, fully aware of the widening global inequalities. This in turn leads to mass migration, endemic problems of criminality and anti-elite insurgencies in many parts of the world. Environmental constraints have so far primarily be felt in terms of resource conflict. Certain key resources such as oil are heavily concentrated in particular areas and Western countries, above all the US, are increasingly dependent on them. The protection of vital resources is thus a crucial component of the West’s security policy. In the longer term, however, the phenomenon of climate change linked to global warming will be much more important, with profound effects on a number of poor countries. These two trends go hand in hand with the proliferation of military technologies in post Cold War world. The spread of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic and cruise missiles and area-impact munitions allow paramilitary groups the capability to target nodes of economic or political power using relatively crude devices and tactics. The combination of these trends is likely to produce radical social movements
characterised by extreme anti-elite action. These movements may be non-state actors targeting their own states or be state actors targeting other states, primarily those of the rich West. They will be driven by economic and environmental issues and take advantage of the availability of accessible military technology.

**The Western security paradigm**

The Western security paradigm is dominated by US policy which defines it and act upon it. US definitions and actions are not always fully accepted by its European allies but the latter have little inclination and capability to seriously affect them. Following the end of the Cold War the US military apparatus has undergone a radical change to be able to face very different threats. These are perceived as coming primarily from the zone of instability in North-East Asia and the Middle East though explicitly defining these threats is much more difficult than in the past. The US has chosen to deal with these diffuse post Cold War threats in an increasingly unilateralist way concerned with guaranteeing maximum freedom of manoeuvre to the US. This has resulted in opposition to or withdrawal from a series of international agreements dealing in particular with the environment and arms control. International agreements are selectively accepted only as far as they are perceived to be in US interest and criticism of this policy is rejected on the basis that what is good for the United States is good for the world.

**Implications of the September 2001 attacks**

Rogers argued that the September 2001 attacks, in spite of European hopes to the contrary, have in fact greatly reinforced the unilateralist outlook of the US coupled with the rhetoric of “if you’re not with us you’re against us”. More particularly, it has also reinforced the US reliance on military means to address security problems instead of addressing the core issues underlying the activities of terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. The inadequacies of such a choice have already been demonstrated by the limited success of the military campaign in Afghanistan which has failed to capture the leaders of Al Qaeda and only succeeded in reducing its capabilities by around 30 per cent. Nonetheless the US appears very unlikely to radically change its policies and adopt a new security paradigm. The fact that European governments seem increasingly distant from Washington’s world-view is again unlikely to change the course of the events. In this scenario, Rogers argued, we should expect the development of a cycle or perhaps a spiral of violence between elites and radical anti-elite movements leading to a prospect of endless war.

**But there is an alternative**

Despite this negative diagnosis, Rogers concluded on a optimistic note stressing that there still is the possibility that the trauma of last year’s attacks encourages individuals, citizen groups, intellectual and indeed political leaders to recognise the long-term security significance of what has happened and to re-double efforts towards a more equitable world. The prevailing response has been the hardening of
the old Western paradigm but there is wide scope for exposing the latter’s futility. A new approach should be based on four main points:

- Address the debt crisis
- Reform the rules of international trade to achieve fair trade – UNCTAD has an important role to play here
- Improve the quality and quantity of development and assistance programmes
- Change the overall approach of the rich West.

It is our responsibility, as academics, activists or ordinary citizens, to exert pressure to make it a reality.

**Discussion:**

- Military influence on mass communication and manipulation of fear
- Role of exclusion and identity in the speaker’s analysis

Identity and exclusion are huge problems but they are often brought into play by social and economic divisions and imbalances rather than the other way round.

- Could power-sharing be a way to tackle the issues the speaker’s identified?

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**The Kashmir Conflict**

*Sumantra Bose*, lecturer in comparative politics at the London School of Economics and author of several books on Kashmir, provided an analysis of the conflict in Kashmir in the light of the latest events. He highlighted the very complex nature of the dispute and outlined the main elements of a possible solution to it.

**The roots of the Kashmir conflict**

All conflicts have specific features but they also have similarities with conflicts in other parts of the world. What is Kashmir conflict about? Why is Kashmir a bitterly contested territory? There are no valuable natural resources in Kashmir, the conflict is essentially about territorial sovereignty and national identity. Under British rule Kashmir was a large, nominally self-governing region with a population 77 per cent Muslim. When the partition of British India led to the creation of the Muslim state of Pakistan, many Pakistani nationalists felt that Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan. Indian elites, who perceived the Indian state as democratic and secular consider that Kashmir naturally belonged to India. On the basis of these stances, India and Pakistan have been locked since 1949 in a zero-sum-game confrontation in which each side is unwilling to compromise on its position. The so-called line of control (LOC) – marking the position of the two sides at the end of the 1947-9 war – has been accepted by the two sides but it is not recognised as an international border. The old colonial province of Jammu & Kashmir is now divided between a larger and more populous part on the Indian side and a smaller part under
Pakistan. Kashmir itself is a very diverse region, comprising, particular on the Indian part, several areas with distinctive geographical characteristics and cultures, including religions, languages, ethnic and caste groups. In political terms, on the Indian side the conflict revolves around three constitutional options: remaining as part of India, join Pakistan or become an independent state. The single largest group is constituted by those supporting independence but there are substantial minorities siding with India and Pakistan. Different areas show different preferences on the constitutional status of Kashmir. Moreover, within each of the three large opinion groups a bewildering number of political groups are active. On the Pakistani side, the majority supports the continuation of the union with Pakistan while a minority group support secession. These divisions at the elite levels are mirrored by divisions in the population at large. The fact that each of these options is incompatible with the others and the distribution of support between them makes the issue of self-determination in Kashmir particularly intractable and makes a solution to the conflict more difficult that many would realise.

The deepening of the conflict

In the last thirty years the conflict has deepened with the spread of mass insurgence. Since 1989-90 a guerrilla campaign is being waged against Indian authorities. Between 40,000 and 80,000 people have died in the insurgence and people are still affected by violence on a daily basis. The insurgence has been fuelled by the long-standing refusal of the Delhi-based Indian elite to grant autonomy and acknowledge the right of self-determination to Kashmir. This rejection of Kashmiri demands has also been compounded by utter mismanagement of the region by the Indian state. It is difficult to imagine a solution to the dispute especially as the guerrilla campaign has further exacerbated the level of conflict. Maintenance of the status quo appears to be an increasingly untenable option as it antagonises the pro-independence and pro-Pakistan factions which together represent the majority of the population. A referendum on self-determination is often mentioned as the only way forward and many consider it an unfulfilled promise which must be honoured. However, even the referendum option is fraught with difficulties. Pakistan wants only two options to be considered – joining Pakistan or remaining with India – and is opposed to independence. Also, any referendum result would only endorse the preferences of a narrow majority and would not be acceptable to substantial minorities. In those circumstances holding a referendum could be a recipe for plunging the region into a full blown civil war. Towns and villages throughout Kashmir are deeply divided, often with streets where one-side is pro-India and the opposite side is pro-Pakistan.

A way forward?

Bose outlined what may be a way forward. Any step forward will have to see a joint effort by India and Pakistan and a willingness to devise complex power-sharing frameworks between them. The latter will have to be based on elected representatives enjoying popular legitimacy and be nested within a system of multi-tier autonomy. The third necessary element is the establishment of effective co-operation across the line of control. The LOC should be seen as a Line of Peace
rather than a line of conflict. Very complex power-sharing agreements such as those adopted in Northern Ireland or Bosnia provide examples of what might be done, though their implementation record is chequered.

Discussion:

- Do you see a role for an external peace-keeping force?

  India is opposed to further internationalisation of the problem as it considers it a bilateral issue. A proposal for setting up joint patrolling, if implemented, could be a first step. The scheme adopted in Northern Ireland is an inspiring solution.

- What is the role of the military?

  India has chosen to rely heavily on the military and to set up a repressive system similar to one you would expect to find in an occupied territory. This has led to a radicalisation of the conflict in Kashmir. However, the military has actually been behind the first tentative steps to de-escalate the conflict. The Indian military has made it clear that repression can only contain the insurgency not solve it and that is up to the politicians to find a lasting solution.
Workshops

Failed States: Do they Collapse or are they Pushed?

Robin Le Mare of Action Aid and Haroon Ahmed Yusuf of Action Aid Somaliland led a workshop discussing the concept of failed state and the case of Somalia. They warned on the risks involved in applying Western concept in different cultural settings and of the negative impact of many outside interventions.

What is state failure?

Robin Le Mare started by providing a definition of state failure and by warning on the need to distinguish between states and civil society. He defined state collapse as the “breakdown of the governmental and societal infrastructures” but this collapse does not necessarily involve the collapse of civil society as “civil society continues to exist, may even thrive, under state collapse”. It is important to identify which institutions go and which ones survive in a collapse. Is state failure a calamitous event? Not necessarily, some territories have a people but not a state while others have a state but the people are little involved in the political process except for paying taxes and fighting the state’s wars so state failure could also be seen as part of normal political process. There are many possible definitions of what a state is and the accepted definition in the West may just be a Euro-centric one forged in war and conquest. The United Nation’s charter asserts the sovereignty and equality of all states and the same time asserts peoples’ right to self-determination. Is there an inherent contradiction between the two principles? How we decide which one predominates when and why? The issue of democracy-by-vote is also a contentious one. Many rural communities use consensus, not voting, for collective decision making.

The Western concept of state

Le Mare pointed out that there are at least three elements of statehood – executive, legislature, administration – and that it is necessary to identify which one of those elements failed. It is also essential to understand whether states fail by themselves or are pushed to fail by outside intervention. Above all, what is the state’s role and purpose? Is it to tell us mortals what to do – a sort of all-knowing Leviathan? Or is it a framework to allow consensual, complex interplay of ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ politics with checks and balances. It is often overlooked that cyberspace communication has blurred the boundaries of states and weakened their authorities within and outside their borders therefore the concept of state requires revisiting. One way of thinking of the state is of an institution abiding by eight principles:

- Minimal recognition of the right to organise
- Boundary
- Graduated sanctions
- Nested with others
- Collective choice
The ‘state’ in non-Western societies

More particularly, in the case of many non-Western societies, if ‘state’ is not part of your social, cultural, linguistic heritage, how can it fail? How is ‘state’ perceived in cultures whose language does not contain its direct equivalent? For instance, in the Somali language the closest equivalent to ‘state’ is the word *qaran* meaning a group of people sharing a covenant – xeer – over the land resources where they live. The equivalent of ‘budget’ is not related to the idea of xeer. However, if we observe the Somali institution of xeer in action – for instance at a well – we can see that it meets the eight properties of a ‘state’. A project of consultation with the poor ran in 1999 revealed huge disjunction between the negative perception of the institutions of state and power and the positive perception of the institutions of home, neighbours, kin and support. Two approaches to the role of international law in cases of state collapse can be contrasted. On the one hand, international law can be called upon to protect a non-functional state from violence. On the other hand, ‘traditional’ international law may be called upon to defend conquest by powerful neighbours, imperialist and expansionist ambitions. The contrast between Somalia and Somaliland is instructive. In the former case outside intervention utterly failed to redress the institutional collapse while in the latter case a ‘do-it-yourself’ approach has succeeded in doing so.

Discussion:

- Is looking for a linguistic definition of state a good idea? A state can be viewed internally and externally. A ‘state’ can still function internally even when it is seen as failed externally.

The linguistic interpretation of the concept of state is important because the local understanding of the concept matters. It helps determine how, why and by whom agreements were reached and whom do we negotiate with when dealing with local people.

The case of Somalia: an overview

Haroun Ahmed Yusuf presented the case of Somalia/Somaliland, one of the most emblematic cases of state failure. More than twenty years of civil war has resulted in the total collapse of all state institutions, including the civil service, the army, the police and the judicial system. All public facilities and many private ones were destroyed and the banking system and the formal economy also collapsed. War and famine have taken a heavy toll on the population with thousands of people killed and many more displaced. An UN-sponsored mission in 1992 failed to achieve its objectives and was subsequently withdrawn. Within the collapse of formal institutions, clan identity has re-emerged leading to the entrenchment of clan-based and regionally-based polities. The North-Western part of the country seceded...
to form the republic of Somaliland in 1991 and subsequently other regions established their own ‘republics’, e.g. Puntland, Jubaland etc... Though the re-emergence of clan identity played a major role in the collapse of the state it was also instrumental in containing the social breakdown as it ensured the survival of the traditional system of governance which is centred on clan leaders. In some instances negotiations between clan leaders have succeeded in creating ‘islands of peace’ in an otherwise war-torn country. It is also remarkable that Somaliland has made much progress since declaring independence but the rest of the country remains in a state of chaos characterised by factional fighting and warlordism.

**The roots of the crisis**

In pre-colonial times Somalia was a pastoral society and economy. The economy was based around pastoral activities, means of productions (land and livestock) were communally owned and trade was essentially constituted by largely reciprocal exchange of livestock between families. Accumulation and economic growth were equated with herd growth. Society was family- and kinship-centred with no chiefs, no state authorities, no landlords or stock-lords. The xeer covenant regulated the relationship between pastoral clans and resolved conflicts over common resources such as water and grazing. The colonial period saw the imposition of a state structure on this pastoral society. This transition had a number of consequences. First, it involved a high degree of centralisation of political authority relative to the very decentralised system previously in place. Units of local administration disrupted herd movements and introduced an alien concept in the traditional leadership mechanism. Second, the imposition of formal rules on the economy led to an increased commercialisation of trade relations. It also led to rangeland deterioration due to overexploitation linked to livestock production for the export markets. Third, it created a social and territorial division between an urban elite linked directly or indirectly to the colonial administration and the rural mass relying on the traditional activities. These trends further deepened in the post-colonial period together with rising factionalism and corruption within the ruling class and economic mismanagement. Yusuf pointed out the following elements as key causal factors of the Somali conflict:

- Failure of the attempt to manipulate the traditional Somali social-system with primary loyalty to the clan and highly decentralised and egalitarian societal rules
- Mismanagement of scarce and declining natural resources – partially linked to experimentation with scientific socialism – which intensified inter-clan hostility and ecological degradation
- Corruption, nepotism, unaccountability and poor governance which has deepened public mistrust of centralised government.
- Increased militarisation and widespread availability of weapons, linked to the Cold War environment and to the war with Ethiopia in 1977/8. This subsequently led to the instauration of a military dictatorship.

As regards Somaliland specifically, Yusuf identified the following key issues in the peace/reconstruction process:

- Rebuilding government institutions and allowing multi-party elections
Domination and Exclusion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Magid Shihade, researcher at the University of Washington, ran a workshop in which he proposed a rationalist analytical framework to understand how states and ethnic groups engage in violence. He applied such a framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and explained why Palestinians living in Israel pursued peaceful means in addressing their grievances while those living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip turned to violence.

Why is there no violence among Palestinians in Israel but there is among those in the West Bank and Gaza?

This question can only be answered if we analyse the role of three key actors and the dynamics of two distinct processes. On the one hand, we need to understand the motivation of three key actors in conflict situations: the super-ordinate group (e.g. the Israeli state), the sub-ordinate group (e.g. the Palestinians, either in Israel proper or in the occupied territories) and external actors (e.g. the US, the United Nations etc.). On the other hand, we need to understand first how the use of violence is legitimated and, second, how it is sustained over time. These dynamics can clearly be seen at work in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Lack of political means

Regardless of whether violence is use by the state or by marginalised ethnic groups it can be a rational option only if its use can be legitimated in the eyes of one’s own constituency and to the external world. This is so because the use of violence has wide-ranging consequences which affect others beyond the immediate conflict situation. Ethnic groups most frequently legitimate their use of violence with reference to three main arguments. First, the lack of peaceful political means to redress grievances. Groups that experience this situation justify their use of violence as the only means available to them to seek change and improve their status. Palestinians inside Israel were granted citizenship, they thus had political
and legal means, though limited, to bargain for better conditions and address their
grievances. In contrast, Palestinians in the occupied territories were not granted
citizenship, therefore they have not enjoyed full civil and legal rights and access to
the civil court system. In the latter case, the lack of peaceful and political avenues
to address grievances and protest against discrimination is apparent, hence the
justification for the use of violence.

Legal and historical grounds

Second, the existence of legal and/or historical grounds for their demands. Ethnic
groups use legal justifications – such as UN resolutions or the Geneva Convention –
for their demands as well as for the means used to pursue such demands. Some
groups use the legal backing of humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty
International to demonstrate the gravity of human rights abuses in their conflict
and thus give their method of resistance an international legal justification. By
granting these legal justifications or not to a given ethnic group the international
community plays a crucial role in conflict situations and may ultimately determine
whether the conflict turns violent. Palestinians living in Israel have always received
little attention from the international community while there are numerous UN
resolutions declaring Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza illegal and
recognising the right to self-determination of the Palestinians living there. Palestinians
living inside Israel were thus left without any legal backing or justification to go beyond peaceful political means while Palestinians in the occupied
territories opted for violence.

External support

The role played by the international legal dimension is closely related to the third
factor Shihade identified: the availability of external support. Groups that are
involved in violent ethnic conflicts generally need outside support, either political or
military. Such forms of support are necessary for the group to start and continue
their armed or violent struggle. Again, Palestinians inside Israel never received any
external support, either from states or non-state organisations while Palestinians in
the occupied territories receive political, financial and moral support from many
sources. Without such forms of assistance it would have been more difficult to
initiate and prolong violent resistance against the Israeli state and its army.

States and the use of violence

States also appeal to ideological and legal principles to discredit ethnic groups’
demands and to legitimate employing violence against such groups. Israel disputed
almost all UN resolutions on the occupied territories and did not recognise
Palestinians’ national and political rights until the 1990s. When Palestinian
resistance to the occupation turned violent in the late 1980s Israel treated it as a
matter of terrorism and criminality. Throughout this period, the state of Israel used
force in dealing with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. It made a much
more limited use of force in dealing with the Palestinians living in Israel as the latter
employed primarily peaceful means. However, despite their formally equal status as
citizens, Palestinians in Israel are still excluded from the official ideology which defines Israel as the state of the Jewish people. States also draw on external support to sustain their repression. Israel has been able to sustain its repression of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories only because it has received financial, political and military support from the United States, the global hegemonic power.

**How violence is sustained**

Once started, violence in ethnic conflicts can be sustained over long periods of time by a variety of sources. From a state’s perspective, the use of violence can be sustained only if it enjoys popular support. In the case of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians public support has been wide and strong. States also need external support, both material and political to sustain their policies over time. Without the backing of the United States, Israel would have faced several UN condemnations and possibly the imposition of economic sanctions that would have severely undermined its ability to repress the Palestinians over a long period of time. States are very reluctant to compromise with ethnic groups using violence for fear of appearing weak and making violence pay. Ethnic groups’ use of violence is perceived as an attack on the security, stability and sovereignty of the state. Israel has time and again used violent retaliation in response to Palestinian violence and has often used violence in a pre-emptive way with the intention to intimidate the Palestinians. Like states, ethnic groups also need popular support among members of the group and external backing to sustain violence over time. Palestinians in the occupied territories have long received both in strong and sustained form. Finally, ethnic groups are also victim of the ‘conflict dynamics’ in which an attack draws a retaliation and so forth in a spiral of violence which deepens animosity between the two sides and makes it increasingly difficult to escape its logic.

**Two solutions, common denominator**

Shihade pointed out that there are only two solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the light of the analysis he presented. The first solution could be the opening of the Israel political system to allow equal representation and participation to the Palestinian people. By granting citizenship to those living in the occupied territories, Israel would remove the most important root cause of violence, i.e. the lack of political means to address grievances. The other solution would be complete political separation between the two communities. Whatever the solution one favours, Shihade stressed, external intervention is essential. Because of the conflict dynamics at play, it would be almost impossible for the two sides, left to their own devices, to find an acceptable solution. There is no precedent for a solution of deep conflicts without either the destruction of one side or external mediation. The international community played an important role in the creation and the development of the conflict and should play a crucial role in its resolution.
The framework presented also fits the conflict in Sri Lanka

Are suicide bombers rational?

They are. Suicidal actions appear rational to individuals who are desperate and see no other way out of the intolerable situation they are in. Religious motivations and societal support are also important

Is it rational to expect the US to change its policy towards Israel?

Not at this stage but it may be when the costs of the policy become too high

Moderator comment: it is important to distinguish between power and identity.

Compromises on power distribution are much easier to achieve than compromises affecting identities. History shows that fundamentalism and the rejection of compromises can win.

The Politicisation of Religion: Mixing Belief with Ideology

Peter Marsden, Arabist, author of several books on Afghanistan and currently Information Coordinator of the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, ran a workshop focused on the connections between religion and politics and on how religion is manipulated for political ends.

Religion and politics

He started by considering the influence that religious groups have on politics. He drew a comparison between Afghanistan and the US arguing that the religious right in America plays a similar role as Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan. The connection between religion and state power can be conceptualised as a spectrum with explicitly secular states such as Turkey at one end and explicit theocratic states such as Iran at the other. Between these two extremes, there are many states which, in one way or another, allow religion to play a role in political life. To evaluate the role played by religion, it is important to go beyond formal rules and to look at its real influence. For instance, he judged the UK to be only a moderately religious state, despite the constitutional position of the Queen as head of both Church and State. In contrast, formally secular states such as the Latin American republics are strongly influenced by the Catholic Church. States such as the USA and Israel are openly under the grip of a dominant religious force. From this perspective, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan would fall just short of a full theocracy at one end of the spectrum.

Westernisation and Islam
Globalisation is bringing about a process of Westernisation of the world also perceived by some as the Christianisation of it. Particularly in the Islamic world there is a lively debate on the possible Islamic answers to the growing hegemony of Western culture and economy. The two options that are most frequently discussed are the co-existence of the two cultures and a rigid separation between them so as to prevent Western and/or Christian values from contaminating Islamic culture. However, some Muslims believe that the way forward is to re-define Islam in a way as to make it an effective counter-ideology to Western globalisation. Taken to its extreme form, this option would conform with the so-called behaviourist model, according to which Islam is about conforming to certain codes. Marsden argued that this version of Islam includes elements that could be called socialist and fascist. However, the relationship between political Islam and social issues is a complex one. On the one hand, states such as Libya and Iran provide what in the West would be called left-wing social welfare while the authority of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan rested exclusively on terror methods.

All religions contain an element of totalitarianism and this can also be seen in so-called secular states such as the US, for instance in the reaction to last year’s attacks which led to Muslim citizens being restricted in their civil rights and even incarcerated. Religion is often linked to politics because it provides a moral justification to the existence of certain elites and to their keeping a grip on power. It can also be used to justify the use of violence to defend such a grip. Concluding on a more practical note, Marsden advised NGOs to be sensitive to the religious dimension of conflicts.

**Discussion**

- General perception in the non-Christian world that the West uses double standards and that it is biased against the Muslim world. This is often reinforced by the discourse in the media.

  Yes, the media are often biased and they can be part of the problem rather than part of the solution, but this is hardly surprising as religion plays an important role in the definition and assertion of identities

- Religion should not be overemphasised as the only root cause of conflict. Economic factors are also powerful determinants.

  Yes, but in Afghanistan religion plays such as a powerful role that is would be very difficult to separate motivations. Moderator: identity and religion are often drawn in and exploited in conflict situations that are primarily economic in nature.

- There is a problem with the motivations and the whole concept of charity work. Western aid is sometimes perceived as biased towards other Christian societies. Donor states should pay more attention in how they distributed their aid so as to avoid creating the impression of bias. The missionary approach that may still be
present in some quarters, at the individual level if not at the institutional one, is also an issue that needs to be addressed.

Yes, charity itself is a Christian concept though it is up to the organisations to move beyond this legacy.

Rights for All: Civilian Capacities for Preventing Conflict and Respecting Human Rights

Tim Wallis and Stuart Kefford of Peaceworkers UK led an interactive workshop to highlight the ability we all have to prevent conflict and defend human rights. They stressed that civilian capabilities will essential to conflict resolution in the future.

Introduction: civilian intervention

Ordinary people – both local and outsiders – have a crucial role in protecting human rights. People have the right to live in peace in midst of conflict. Peaceworkers UK does peace and human rights work in conflict situations. It is often assumed that military intervention is necessary to solve ethnic conflict, but traditional techniques can be difficult to use in situations were power is one-sided. What is needed is humanitarian intervention and this is best carried out by civilians. The UN is increasingly following this approach with more and more civilian unarmed operations taking place, for example in Chechnya, Guatemala, Nicaragua and in the West Bank. It is the mere fact of international presence that is important, not just that the military is not involved. Not a single person on civilian mission, or a person they accompany, has been killed over the last 20 years. People generally do not like doing anything that is perceived as illegal or immoral so the presence of unarmed civilians can put moral and social pressure on parties engaged in conflict. For example, the Israeli army has been constrained by the presence of international humanitarian forces in places such as the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. There are now efforts to build a Civilian Peace Service in the UK and a similar project for a non-violent peace force in India whose first mission may be in Sri Lanka. Despite their pleading for the use of civilian forces, Wallis and Kefford also made clear they did not want to suggest that civilians can do everything that the military can do and pointed out that in a conflict such as the one in Rwanda, for instance, military force was much needed.

Role play

To explore how ordinary people can have a role in building respect for human rights and in preventing conflict, they entered into the interactive part of the workshop in which they asked the audience to join a role play. They first laid down the ground rules: no physical violence, keep voices down, no crossing a rope line. Participants were than asked to join one of three groups: haves, have-nots and outsiders. The symbolic line represents the differences between haves and have-nots. Outsiders
were asked to initially confine themselves to watching and to later on try to intervene and help resolve the conflict. The three groups were briefed by a convener about their respective objectives: the haves (H) aim to maintain their privileges, the have-nots (HN) aim to acquire more rights and the outsiders (OS) aim to mediate between the two sides.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Action/Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>do not really think about it, are largely unaware of it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>ask a H person to come over to the HN area to see and try to understand the HN situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>no one wants to go over there because they all feel threatened, they worry for their safety and are also not particularly bothered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>question authority of the OS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>gain some ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>felt that the OS were distracting them from keeping their space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>felt that pressure built up when the line came closer; they did not trust the OS initially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>did not feel any serious pressure until the OS came in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>felt sense of injustice and powerlessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>felt that the OS were not making strategic or moral pleas to them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>felt that knowing their entry point gave them a sense of importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>felt that the OS did not try to find out what their problems were</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>distrusted the OS because while they were talking to them the line moved closer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The role play illustrated how outsiders can play a crucial role in conflict situations. Outsiders have many ways in which they can put pressure on the parties in conflict, for instance economic pressure in the form of aid from the EU or the US or political pressure on their own governments. They can also put pressure on non-state actors, the only form of pressure that is beyond them is military pressure. What is important is that just the fact of being there as an outsider can act as a deterrent to conflict. Many states do not accept military forces but do accept unarmed international presence. For instance, the peace process in Sri Lanka explicitly mentions the inclusion of an unarmed peace force. The speakers concluded on the hope that in ten or twenty years’ time such civilian monitors will be more effective and more widespread.

**Discussion**

- Doubts about the universal acceptability of such missions, since it is difficult to achieve neutrality

  The UN is losing its military role and wants something to fill that gap. Countries to do not want NATO bombs dropped on them

- Doubts about right of intervention in relation to national sovereignty
These issues are addressed in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ report [http://www.ciise-iciss.gc.ca/report-e.asp]

- Issues of freedom to move and security of international aid workers

There is no guarantee that they will be safe, we must weigh up risks and benefits. Unarmed civilian mission will not work in any situation. There is need for training, political and economic backing and sensitivity to the historical roots of conflicts. The overall aim is to deter violence by making the international presence felt and there is a great potential for unarmed missions to do so. It is also essential to pass on knowledge and learn from previous experiences.

- Suggestion to support local groups and equip them with the necessary skills.

The Role of Diaspora Groups: Inclusion or Exclusion?

Gary Botting of the University of British Columbia and Susan Pattie of University College London ran a workshop focused on the role of diaspora groups in the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion and in conflict situations. Botting challenged the notion of diaspora to explain the nature of terrorist networks and the threat to human rights deriving from the ‘War against Terror’. Pattie analysed the nature of diaspora groups by focusing on one of its ‘classical’ manifestation: the Armenians.

Terrorism as the new diaspora

Gary Botting started his talk arguing that terrorism has many manifestations and that it has been used by conquering armies for millennia. Examples of such a use are the Catholic Inquisition and colonisation by Britain and Belgium. The terms terrorism and terrorist have their origins in the French revolution and its brutality, the same brutality, was present during the reign of Queen Victoria and in the way native populations were treated in Frontier America. Terror and genocide have marked political and ethnic expansion throughout history. Today’s terrorists are like an army of ants on the march seeing a “subtle dispersal of zealots” set to make supreme sacrifices to God and to teach others a lesson. This form of terrorism has prevailed in the post-WW2 period in which terrorism has been used for nationalistic goals by such groups as the IRA, the Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda. These groups have dispersed members across Europe and America in the same way as Christian missionaries did in the past. They are secret and “sew the seed of terrorism” around the world. The Islamic Jihad, in particular, is a deliberate and methodical dispersal of people working against Israel and the latter’s ally, the US. In this sense, it can be seen as a form of diaspora group. The term diaspora means dispersal, it initially referred to Babylonian Jews and now it refers to any group of people living beyond their mainland. The diaspora nature of contemporary terrorism
can be seen in the way the September 2001 attacks were planned and executed. In the wake of the attacks, the US secretary of state Colin Powell remarked that US borders were too porous. Moreover the US supported the perpetrators of the attacks in its universities and flight training schools.

**Extraditions and justice**

The trans-border, diaspora nature of contemporary terrorism has its mirror phenomenon in the multiplication of inter-state cooperation in the fight against it. At the centre of this is the issue of the extradition of suspects and justice versus vengeance. Many suspects face extradition to the US and it is questionable whether individuals will face a fair trial or will just be victim of vengeance. Guilt by association is not sufficient ground for extradition, evidence is needed to support extradition, especially taking into account the US’s thirst for vengeance. The rhetoric of “either with us or against us” has created a climate of international paranoia and this is not good for those unfairly accused on involvement in last September’s attacks. Canada is the country most exposed to US pressure for the extradition of suspects and has a tradition of ‘caving in’ to US demands but a new anti-terrorism bill aims to protect the accused by refusing extradition to countries where they face a climate of hostility. This could be a basis for resisting American demands. This is not only a Canadian problem, however, as in the near future many countries can expect increasingly strong pressures from the US to extradite individuals without strong evidence.

**Diasporas: the case of Armenia**

Susan Pattie linked her talk directly to the title of the workshop and analysed the interplay between exclusion and inclusion within the Armenian diaspora. The term diaspora refers to people living beyond what they perceive as their original homeland and connected by networks into a ‘tangled mass’ of formal and informal links across different countries. Diaspora has thus a different meaning from ‘trans-national organisation’, it is constituted by families and human resources, a base from which more formal organisations ‘jump off’. These organisations form political lobbies and allocate aid, they thus constitute the diaspora’s social and political landscape. They may seem monolithic organisations but they are often deeply influenced by a few key individuals. A real or imagined homeland is at the centre of a diaspora but it is not crucial for it, as the case of the Armenian diaspora indicates. The ‘homeland’ of the Armenian diaspora goes well beyond the existing Armenian state. Pattie argued that it is more accurate to talk of ‘kin state’ rather than ‘homeland’ in the Armenian case. Most of the Armenian lived until early 20th century in what is now central and eastern Turkey while the remainder lived under the Russian Empire. The genocide perpetrated by the Turks at the end of the First World War led to a dispersal of the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire, first to neighbouring countries such as Lebanon and Syria and later from these to Europe and North America. The Armenian is thus a ‘diaspora of a diaspora’ as it went through at least two waves of dispersal. The part of the original homeland under Tsarist rule later became a republic of the USSR and throughout the Soviet period efforts were made to control the diaspora groups and divert their attention from the
ex-Ottoman lands to those within Soviet Armenia. In particular, an organisation called HOK even led a concerted effort to ‘repatriate’ 150,000 Armenians which resulted in the repatriated feeling strangers in their supposed ‘homeland’ and betrayed by the official propaganda. However, the diaspora organised itself with its own ideas and made clear it perceived itself as independent from the ‘homeland’, not just an extension of it. With the end of the USSR, the Armenian republic became an independent, sovereign state. The diaspora can now visit the Armenian republic freely but relations between the two sides are still difficult. To a large extent the government has continued the old policy of trying to make the diaspora the ‘periphery of the centre’ but the latter has resisted such efforts. For instance, the government has invested significant financial resources in persuading the diaspora that the Armenian republic is their homeland but at the same time it has also tried to wrest from them the control of how aid is allocated. Other points of friction are the political stance of the diaspora and the issue of double citizenship. The diaspora has tended supported at subsequent elections a party which is relatively unpopular in Armenia though a few of its high-profile members advise the Armenian government. The Armenian republic still does not accept dual citizenship and the issues of who is an Armenian and who has the power to decide and to draw borders is still largely unresolved. Pattie concluded pointing out that diaspora groups can also have negative effects. In the Armenian case, diaspora groups have put pressure on the republic not to settle the conflict with Azerbaijan and to pursue a hard line on the issue of the Turkish genocide. Diaspora groups should push the government towards achieving peace not fuelling conflict and instigating war.

Discussion

- Further emphasis on the fact that diaspora groups can be an obstacle to the achievement of peace, rather than the other way round, examples: Irish in the US, Israeli settlers, Cypriot diaspora.

  Pattie: Yes. Sometimes this leads to tension with the host country, for example the attitude of the US Armenian diaspora towards Turkey, a key US ally. There must be internal debate within diasporas and individuals need to have the courage to dissent from the prevailing line if diaspora groups are to have a positive influence on conflict in their homelands. It should also be borne in mind that there are many diaspora groups which work towards the achievement of a peaceful solution to conflicts, but they are often marginalised in their ‘homelands’ and in their host countries.

- What is the impact of technological advances on diaspora cohesion?

  Botting: cellular phones and email have helped diasporas engaged in terrorism in increasing the secrecy of their actions.
  Pattie: email has certainly made communication within the diaspora easier though it is not allowed or severely restricted in some places, such as Syria.
Redefining Economic Strategies and Social Issues

Claude Muya of One World Week, Luka Biong Deng of the University of Sussex and Ariyasena Gamage of the Gamage Hospital in Sri Lanka facilitated a workshop on the connection between economic and social issues in conflict situations. Their different case studies showed how complex the connection can be.

One World Week: development and education

Claude Muya indicated that One World Week’s approach is to affect the communities in which it is active. One World Week (OWW) is a development programme focused on educating members of development associations on the global issues affecting development, life and society. It grew out of several needs: to learn and to understand how the world is changing; to celebrate cultural diversity; to raise awareness of global justice and, more generally, of development in all its different aspects. It operates at two levels: grass-roots and institutional. OWW does not go to the various countries to start the activities but activities are initiated by the local groups themselves and supported by OWW. There are thousands of local groups in the UK, Africa, Asia and some European countries. Each group plans an event each year in October during which issues affecting their communities are raised. Groups invite people from the community to take part in the event, learn and take action on the issues affecting them. At the institutional level, OWW operates programmes to allow local groups to get involved with mentors, usually people from an ethnic minority background who have experience so as to bring in new people and integrate experiences. This year’s theme is ‘Into Action’ and is intended to initiate people into action that brings about change. Another successful programme is ‘Enriching the South’. Under this programme OWW traces people who have knowledge but are marginalised in society and helps them become integrated to allow both parties – themselves and mainstream society – to learn from each other. He then moved to the interactive part of its intervention and illustrated how global issues and individual experiences are tied together by telling the story of a little girl from Nepal. The story was about a girl forced to go away from her village with her uncle who got her employed in the carpet industry. But pressure from various organisations has raised awareness of the issue of child labour and nowadays many products from developing countries carry a sign informing people that the product has not been made with child labour. The story illustrated the interconnectedness of many issues related to development: how consumerism in the west is linked to child labour and exploitation; how the exploitation of children by parents and relatives deprives children of their right to education; how consumers in rich countries can affect through their choices patterns of development in poor countries. He then concluded stressing that there are different ways of raising awareness and no one is perfect but what is important is to find ways of empowering people.

Society, economy and conflict in Sudan

Luka Biong Deng discussed the workshop’s themes in relation to the conflict in Sudan. Ethnic and religious divisions are at the roots of the Sudanese conflict.
Despite the presence of over 60 distinct ethnic groups and 100 languages, the fundamental divide is North-South between the North, which is Arab and Muslim, and the South which is Black African and Christian/Animist. The fundamental problem is one of the exclusion. The Sudanese paradox is that the South – which is relatively modern and well endowed with natural resources – is marginalised in public life and dominated by the North. Islam and Arabism are used as official discourses to exclude the minority people from the South. The resource imbalance between North and South is thus compounded by the ethnic/religious divide. When international agencies deal with civil war situations, they should look at the historical background in order to be effective in their intervention. Interventions tend to focus more on emergency whereas there is a great need for intervention to focus on re-habilitiation.

**Economic decisions in conflict situations**

He then moved to consider how people adapt their economic decisions in civil war situations. To understand ‘macro-issues’ such as economic development and its social effects it is important to look at the micro-level and analyse how households deal with the effects of civil war and, more generally, at the basic issues of social capital. People are not passive in civil war, they are confronted by numerous shocks and they have to deal with them. The question is: how do people deal with these shocks to sustain their livelihoods? The main reaction is to diversify resources to prevent dependence on a single one which may be vulnerable to destruction. Outside observers have often misplaced perception of the dynamics of civil war. They assume that civil war disrupts social capital but this assumption fundamentally misreads the strengths of people in Africa. Despite the ravages of civil war, people are mistaken in thinking that no re-habilitation programme is possible. There are immense opportunities for development while the war is still under way. The UN has tried to initiate such programmes but the EU is resolutely opposed to start development programmes while fighting continues. But this means forsaking opportunities for development. If we understand development in terms of social capital rather than physical infrastructure than peace is not a pre-condition for development. But it is essential that minorities be involved in this development as the exclusion of minorities is the fundamental cause of conflict.

**Identity and exclusion in the Sri Lankan medical profession**

Ariyasena Gamage talked on the impact on the health sector of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. Two main ethnic groups live in Sri Lanka: a Sinhalese majority and a Tamil minority. Until the early 1970s the two groups co-existed peacefully and Sri Lanka was widely considered a model of democracy. From 1972 onwards an open conflict started to develop in the north of the country where the Tamils are in a majority. Since 1983 the conflict has turned into a bloody separatist war between Tamil radicals and the Sri Lanka state. The war is draining huge resources from the state, 22 per cent of public expenditure were related to the war in 1997. The ethnic conflict has severely affected the health sector where it has compounded at least three other forms of conflict: between Western medicine and the traditional Ayurveda medicine; between medical professionals and the other workers and
between urban and rural areas. Tamils were traditionally in a majority within the health profession. The government’s attempt to redress this imbalance by increasing the proportion of Sinhalese has led to the exclusion of Tamils in many areas, especially rural ones. This exclusion is one of the main factors why the Tamil minority has declared war on the state. The government has also tried to compensate for the policy of ethnic balance by establishing separate medical schools in the North and in South of the country so as to cater for the two communities. This has created a deep divide within the profession, with an increased tendency to geographical separation and the development of ethnically segregated medical associations. In turn, this segregation affects health professionals’ ability to deal with clients where many issues of trust, mutual suspicion and language barriers arise. One of the most worrying aspects of the ethnic conflict within the medical profession is the brain drain caused by health professionals – both Tamil and Sinhalese – leaving the country. This pattern is being replicated within other professional groups – e.g. civil servants – and is increasingly undermining the state’s ability to deliver public services. Policies and programmes for building trust among professionals across the ethnic divide are urgently needed.

**Discussion:**

- Reasons for Tamil preponderance in health profession?

  Relative lack of opportunities and of resources, tradition of high education dating back to colonial times

- Could programmes to build trust help?

  It is very early stage; the peace accord has been signed only recently; divisions still prevail; much more needs to be done.

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**Ethnic Cleansing and Repression**

*Dejan Jovic* of the University of Stirling and *Estella Schmidt* of the Peace in Kurdistan Campaign ran a workshop discussing how people can be demonised first and then repressed in conflict situations, focused on the cases of former Yugoslavia and Kurdistan.

**The roots of the Yugoslav conflict: strong or weak states?**

Dejan Jovic addressed the events in the Balkans, notably in former Yugoslavia and its successor states, over the past decade. He challenged the prevailing accounts of the political developments in the Balkans claiming that the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the eruption of violence among its successor states can be explained by the weakness of those states – both the old Yugoslavia and the new
ones – and by the effects of ideology. He pointed out that two dominant explanations are currently advanced. The first one asserts that communist states were strong states while their civil societies were weak so that states deliberately provoked ethnic violence. The second thesis explains violent conflict in the 1990s as the result of ancient hatreds among the ethnic groups living in the area. Jovic rejected both. He argued that violence erupted because states were not able to prevent conflict rather than the other way round. In turn, states were weak primarily because of the communist ideology was centred on the idea that states should ‘wither away’. This belief in the disposable nature of states was common to all communist countries but was especially strong in Yugoslavia, as the latter developed its peculiar brand of ‘self-management’ communism. The dominant idea in Yugoslavia was to dissolve the state into society, to ‘socialise’ the state. Most political developments after 1968 can be seen as the expression of this belief that the state should ‘wither away’. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and subsequent violence can thus be understood as a case of a state ‘committing suicide’. Successor states, born in conflict and sharing that ideological legacy were also weak. This is why one of the main tasks of the international community in the Balkans is to engage in ‘state building’. The thesis that violence was determined by ethnic hatred is problematic because there is no empirical evidence about such hatred before the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. It is also morally problematic because it accuses those who suffered and not the elites who failed to build strong institutions. Jovic also challenged the prevailing approach to the analysis of the effect of ideology. The focus is usually on the links between communism, nationalism and post-communism while we should really approach the events in terms of the connection between the early phases of the development of liberal democracy and private violence. The key issue was the discourse on majority and minority. In the communist narrative elections did not matter and the concepts of majority and minority were not relevant. In contrast, the new – liberal democratic – narrative is centred on the dichotomy majority/minority. But the communist narrative asserted that minorities are not protected in liberal democratic regimes so the new discourse generated fear in ethnic minorities as no one wants to be a minority at the mercy of a majority. Jovic concluded arguing that state weakness and ideology have largely been neglected so far in the analysis of the events in the Balkans but are essential to any understanding of them.

**Turkish oppression and Western neglect: the tragedy of the Kurds**

Estella Schmidt presented the case of the Kurds living in Turkey. The Kurds are one of the largest nations without a state and live in four states with the majority of them in Turkey. The core of the Kurdish problem is the denial of the existence of the Kurdish people by the Turkish state. The latter is organised on racist principles whereby non-Turks are denied any legitimacy by the state. According to the official Turkish policy, Kurds are either ‘mountain Kurds’ or they do not exist. Anyone who recognise the Kurds as a distinctive minority ethnic group is “an enemy of the Turkish state and nation”. Turkey is now the only country in the world not to recognise the Kurds as a people and the Kurdish culture and language are systematically repressed. Aggressions and atrocities against the Kurds started right after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and have continued ever
since. There have been thousands of well-documented violations of human rights and many others go unrecorded. All the NGOs active in the protection of human rights, as well as Western foreign ministries, are concerned with these violations of international law and several UN resolutions and conventions. More reporters have been killed in the last ten years in Turkey than during the entire Second World War. Kurds also face exclusion and repression in the other states in which they live – Iran, Iraq and Syria – and Turkey has often tried to influence these other states’ policies towards the Kurds for fear of spill-overs into Turkey. Only recently, the Turkish government announced that a declaration of independence by Iraqi Kurds would be seen as a declaration of war. Turkey’s co-operation with the brutal Iraqi repression of Kurds ordered by Saddam Hussein is also well documented. Turkey has reacted to international criticism of its actions in two ways. On the one hand, it has tried to keep a lid of silence on its policies by ruthlessly intimidating anyone who denounces them. Turkish authors and publishers who dare to break this silence are routinely sent to trial on charges of treason. On the other hand, it launched an international peace prize named after the founder of the republic – the Ataturk Peace Prize – in an attempt to promote its reputation. However, the attempt backfired when Nelson Mandela refused to accept it. Schmidt argued that despite the magnitude and gravity of the Kurdish tragedy the world still turns a blind eye to it. Reports detailing and documenting the extent of human rights violation in Turkey are published annually but they are routinely ignored. What is worse, Western countries with the US at their forefront are actively supporting the Turkish state and are thus accomplices in the atrocities committed in its name. The situation has even worsened in the wake of last year’s terrorist attacks in the US. Turkey’s role as the key ally of the US in the Middle East has been greatly reinforced and the strategic importance of the relation between the two countries provides a convenient excuse for Turkey to get away with its policies towards the Kurds. If this state of affairs is to change, Schmidt concluded, it is essentially that the veil of silence surrounding the Kurdish case be broken and all those concerned with human rights have a duty to do so: “please do not forget that genocide is not the name of a street in the city the Kurds want to live in”.

**Discussion**

- Are EU conditions related to Turkish membership making any difference?
  
  Not much, the problem is the Turkish constitution

- Is it possible to have effective non-nation states?
  
  Jovic: Not without ideology. The EU would probably not survive a collapse of liberal democracy. Ideology is what keeps countries together and all sorts of conflicts would become nationalistic conflicts were the main narrative to collapse

- What are the origins of the racist ideology in Turkey?
It is linked to the historical development of the Turkish state, in particular the attempt to forge a monolithic new nation. Genocide of the Armenians also linked to this.

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The Role of the Media: Propaganda and Divisiveness

Annabel McGoldrick and Jake Lynch of Conflict and Peace Forums led a workshop analysing the role of the media in reporting and constructing images of conflict. The contrasting a model of ‘peace’ journalism to the currently prevailing ‘war’ journalism and emphasised the role of audiences in influencing the way journalism is conducted.

‘War’ journalism

Annabel McGoldrick opened the workshop with a discussion of the concept of ‘peace journalism’. She referred to the work of Johann Galtung who first drew a distinction between what he called ‘war journalism’ and ‘peace journalism’. She pointed out that in 1997 the first summer school in peace journalism was held with a large participation of journalists working in independent media. Galtung developed the concept of war journalism to highlight that the reporting most of the media produce is justifying violence. War journalism is characterised by the following traits:

- There are only two parties
- There are only good and bad
- There are only winners and losers
- It is victory orientated
- It focusses on elite voices, usually politicians
- It emphasises violence
- It emphasises statements by protagonists

‘Peace journalism’

To it McGoldrick opposed the model of ‘peace journalism’. This would be focussed on understanding the causes of conflict instead of justifying it. Peace journalism could be thought of as analogous to a health report, mapping the conflict in question and aiming at a much broader picture. It would include more than two parties, indeed it would aim at including the maximum breadth of voices, paying particular attention to those from the grass-roots. Above all, it would be focussed on explaining why violence occurs. She then discussed why the media tend to produce ‘war journalism’ rather than ‘peace journalism’. Several factors are at play. Journalism is increasingly a competitive business which means that the production of news is commercialised and commodified. Journalists also have very rigid views of what is newsworthy, which tend to be very biased towards violence. It could be called an ‘addiction to violence’ which stems from the belief that ‘violence sells’. Through their reporting the media can have a significant impact on the
development of a conflict. This determines that one of the problems journalists encounter is that they become actors in the conflict. To counter the tendency towards ‘war journalism’ it is necessary to have training programmes for journalists. One such example is a peace-building media conference organised by the University of Sydney. These training courses should emphasise an ‘ethics of reporting’ focussed on peace-building, peace mediation and confidence building. The Conflict and Peace Forums is very active in this direction. It runs a website and has organised several seminars and roundtables on conflict reporting which have led to two publications being produced. This work is part of a broader reflection within the journalistic profession sparked by the amount of criticism levelled on media coverage of conflicts. She concluded saying that conflict reporting should really be seen as a form of conflict resolution and that therefore constructive, dialogue-oriented reporting of conflict is essential.

**Reporting: linear or ‘loop-shaped’?**

Jake Lynch started her talk with a critical analysis of the standard theory of reporting which sees it as a linear process along the following lines:

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<th>N</th>
<th>news-makers activities</th>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>these constitute facts</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>journalists report facts</td>
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<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>media produce news</td>
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<tr>
<td>R/A</td>
<td>readers/audience consume them</td>
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She argued that this linear conception overlooks the fact that there is an important ‘feedback loop’ between producers of news and the readers/audience. The latter can become news-makers, as Andy Warhol first pointed out, and a programme such as Big Brother is a clear contemporary example of this phenomenon. People are usually adept at creating facts that are going to be reported, on the basis of their own experience as audience. This ‘feedback loop’ is thus self-perpetuating as patterns of reporting will influence further events and further activities. For instance, the rapid succession of the Gulf War, the conflict in Kosovo and the ‘war on terrorism’ over the last decade have produced a ‘feedback loop’ of the type described above. Following on the previous contribution, Lynch emphasised that the central issue in the ethics of reporting conflict is how to explain the occurrence of violence; a willingness to examine its causes. The dominant narrative tends to emphasise violence for its own sake and to use an essentialist rhetoric – such as ‘ancient hatred’ between Jews and Arabs – to reinforce it. Only a holistic approach encompassing all the stages of the production and consumption of news can provide a remedy to this state of affairs. To illustrate her point, Lynch showed a video of an ITV evening news programme reporting of the case of a ‘dirty bomb’ plot uncovered in the US. She asked the audience to identify the who, what, when,
where, why and how of the report and it immediately emerged that the ‘why’ had not been addressed in the report. This omission highlighted the wider problem of a lack of interest in understanding the sources of conflict. Related issues are also the reliability of news sources and the way violent events are fitted within the news schedule of any particular day. Lynch also argued that the US – and the other Western countries in general – have a virtual monopoly of powerful media outlets such as CNN and thus of the ability to shape public opinion. Negative attitudes towards the US should be seen as a reaction against this domination. She remarked that public opinion surveys show that the majority of people outside the West think that the terrorist attacks against the US were provoked by US foreign policy.

McGoldrick pointed out that there are elements of ‘peace journalism’ in today’s media but those journalists pursuing it are often marginalised and thus need support to make their voices heard. Lynch then showed a second video on a Somalian bank which had been closed following US allegations that it was connected to Al-Qaeda. The video showed the Somalian bankers being shown a list of suspected financiers of Al-Qaeda with their names on it. The bankers respond accusing the US of ‘killing’ them financially. Lynch argued that this kind of videos suggest that ‘positive intervention’ – e.g. on the Kurdish problem in Iraq – is needed but ‘negative intervention’ – e.g. closing down the bank in Somalia – is what takes place.

Discussion

- Lack of moral standards and one-sidedness in British journalism, e.g. in the coverage of May Day

  Narrative is often decided in advance; BBC is biased; commodification of news and the ‘entertainment’ factor; low rating of foreign news

- How can journalists get more control of their work?

  Journalists are traditionally ‘non-joiners’; the answer may lie in adopting a network approach and in upholding the professional ethics

- Journalists often take for granted identities and ethnicities of the parties in conflict and this contributes to the conflict dynamics

  Yes, it happens quite clearly in the British media

- How US policy on terrorism would be reported in Islamic media

  As an expression of the domination of American imperialism concerned with the protection of capitalist interests and that much more attention would be paid to the situation in the Middle East.

- Last September’s attacks had the effect of making American imperialism more transparent, of exposing the gap between the rhetoric on human rights and the practice of hypocrisy and double standards in defending them.
NGOs, Civil Society and Cultural Sensitivity

Tony Jackson of International Alert and Aloys Tegera of the Pole Institute ran a workshop focused on the issue of cultural sensitivity and its influence on the work of NGOs and organisations of the civil society.

Cultural sensitivity and conflict in the Congo

The speakers addressed the workshop’s themes from the perspectives of his experiences in the Congo as a relief worker in the aftermath of ethnic conflicts and natural catastrophes. He discussed the cultural sensitivity of NGOs active in areas which are being ravaged by war or have experienced it in the recent past. He argued that a ‘culture of impunity’ pervaded Congolese society to such an extent that violence became an integral part of people’s experience and that this affected their ability to both address their past and develop their future. He witnessed 5-7 year-old schoolchildren going on the rampage. The actions of these youngsters are a mirror of the society in which they are growing up. In a similar vein, he pointed out that warlords that had formed around local militias have in the post-conflict environment become legitimate figures of authority commanding the respect of other parties in negotiated settlements. As regards the effects that violent conflict can have on the relationship people have with their past and their memories, he cited the example of massacres that led to mass burial. Mass graves were alien forms of burial to the local people of the Congo and coming to terms with the loss and then mass burial of loved ones deeply affects the ability of various ethnic groups to deal with the past. These examples indicate the pervasiveness of this culture of impunity and the challenge it represents for NGOs. How can they deal with a situation in which children are the perpetrators of violence? How to deal with a situation in which war criminals are elevated to a position of authority? Tegera pointed out that violent attacks and reciprocal vengeance locked Congolese society into a spiral of attacks and counter-attacks. The ethnic groups involved – Hutus and Tutsis – further complicated the process by refusing to acknowledge that the acts of violence they perpetrated against each other constituted acts of aggressions. They both claim the status of victims and evade responsibility for the violence they committed. Tegera concluded stating that any peace in the Congo would have to first and foremost address the culture of impunity that has taken root there as no foundation for a peaceful post-conflict society could be built on such a cultural legacy.

Discussion

- Whether conflicts can best be solved from the inside or from the outside.
Tegera: Difficult to generalise, conflict usually have important internal roots but also external connection; ideally a coupling of the two sides would be desirable; however often external intervention is not sensitive to the local culture and historical background and imposes ‘alien’ solution that do not work in that environment; one way of dealing with that is to have a ‘bottom up’ approach supported from the outside. Jackson: “There is certainly a role for outside brokers in conflict situations but any agreement must enjoy indigenous support and acceptance”. Albania and Macedonia are two examples where the two sides worked well together.

A consensus emerged that empowering local ‘peace networks’ is one of the most effective ways in which NGOs can help solve conflicts. However, NGOs too have room for improvement in their cultural sensitivity.

- NGOs are accountable to international (Western) donor not to the local population, how can they acquire legitimacy?

  Difficult situation; NGOs usually have to work in a context of collapsed states and often have little expertise to work in such a context.

- Between the local and the international level, what about the regional context?

  Regional context often very important, but it can as likely be a part of the problem as a part of the solution.

- Are there examples of international interventions that have been both successful and culturally sensitive?

  Stephen Alston (St Ethelburga’s Centre for Reconciliation and Peace): East Timor could be one, though some problems occurred there too.

- Warning that not all cultural practices are positive and conducive to conflict resolution, e.g. example of the Kosovar Albanian with a cultural preference for vengeance and blood feuds.
Keynote Address

Our Common Cause

Patricia Wallace and Norma Heaton of the Northern Ireland’s Women’s Coalition delivered a keynote address illustrating the role of women’s networks in working towards a lasting peace agreement in Northern Ireland and their role in the implementation of the agreement.

The women’s movement in Northern Ireland

The Women’s Coalition was created in the aftermath of the decision by the Irish and British governments in February 1996 to begin talks about the solution of the Northern Ireland impasse. Earlier, women had been involved in the peace movement in the 1970s but very few women took part in high politics. Between 1992 and 1992, only three women were elected for MPs and there were no women MEPs. Moreover, issues in which women are particularly interested, ‘real life’ issues, were not on the agenda of government. The feeling of continued marginalisation of women and their concerns from politics led the Northern Irish women’s movement in the 1980s to overcome its divisions and started to hold conferences and debates so as to bring women from different backgrounds together to talk about conflict.

“Say goodbye to the dinosaurs!”

Finally, Women’s Coalition (WC) was created as an umbrella group to contest elections for the ‘constitutional’ assembly charged with negotiating an agreement on Northern Ireland. Those involved agreed to base their work on the principles of inclusion, equality and human rights. One of the main problems for WC was the electoral system, which required broad geographic distribution of votes across Northern Ireland and the creation of administrative structure for the coalition, significant fundraising, etc. WC’s involvement of the election had the effect of pressuring other parties to field women candidates. WC campaigned on the slogan “Say goodbye to the dinosaurs!”. Two candidates were elected, one from a rural nationalist area and the other from an urban loyalist area. The two elected delegates put a lot of effort into implementing WC’s ideas and concerns despite facing problems in dealing with their male colleagues who had attitudes along the lines of “women should stand by their men”. This male ethos made the ‘constitutional assembly’ a hard place for women delegates to work in. They focused on ‘real life’ issues such as education and public transport and insisted on equality. As many argued that peace would not succeed if some parties were excluded, women insisted on inclusion, but understood also as bringing community groups, employers and others into play, which parties opposed. The idea was to bring new ideas and language into conflict. Some called this strategy ‘community sector’ politics. WC fielded numerous proposals regarding the need to integrate education, inclusion of women, human rights agenda, Civic Forum, comprehensive review of police service, release of political prisoners, bringing in victims of violence, etc. Women’s Coalition sees the Good Friday Agreement as the beginning of a phase of political maturity. Once the agreement had been drafted, WC
campaigned for a YES vote and later decided to run for elections to the Assembly. They fielded 8 candidates and 2 were elected. This success came despite the fact that candidates had to run a non-traditional campaign because of the lack of funds.

**WC and the implementation of the Good Friday agreement**

*Women’s Coalition* also played an important role in the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. It proposed the creation of the Implementation Group to help overcome many problems the agreement was faced with. One of them was the resignation of First Minister David Trimble and WC was instrumental in helping him getting re-elected. Implementing the peace agreement was also difficult because messages of peace are hard to accept in societies used to conflict. There is a need to establish processes of reconciliation of people. For instance, WC proposed that victims of violence should be fully involved in the process of reconciliation. More generally, the *Women’s Coalition* proposed a number of reforms to redress the divisions and the unfairness in employment practices, post-primary education system and policing both in terms of genders and communities. Central to this effort was the creation of the Equality Commission – now the Equality Act is being drafted. As regards policing WC fully supports the work done by the Patten Commission.

**The way forward**

The Agreement transcends the past and the difference relative to the past is enormous. But there are still many problems. The peace has been made by politicians but needs to be made by people too. The decline of large-scale violence has been replaced by aggressions. WC will continue to work to improve representation and participation of women in politics. Councillors in local assemblies are still 70 per cent male. The existence of WC improved representation of women in the mainstream parties with the result that three women are now in the NI government. WC is a coalition, not a political party, it should be seen as a microcosm of NI society. This requires constant consultation, discussion and participation, which is difficult and time-consuming but very important. Our main goal is equal representation at all levels. The Women Coalition rather than the old parties based on tribal politics represents the future for Northern Ireland.

**Discussion:**

- How did WC overcome the constraints of the electoral system, despite lack of funds, little organisation
  
The strategy was to ask voters to put WC candidates somewhere on their list of preferences
- Suggestion of a women’s group in the Basque country
‘Peace Cabinet’

Comments and General Discussion

Chris Dolon (LSE, UK) argued that the issues of exclusion and identity are especially important after last year’s terrorist attacks in the US. There is a need to build a coalition against the coalition pursuing war. The rhetoric of the ‘war against terrorism’ has generated the mindset by which “if you are not with us you are against us”. This discourse fixes identities and determines exclusion, the exact opposite of what we should work for. He thought there were a number of common themes in the workshops held on the second day. The first one was the fact that elites were widely felt to be deaf towards many problems affecting minorities. This deafness on the part of the elites makes marginalised groups feel humiliated by the sense of not being heard. Humiliation in turn leads to frustration and violence. There is an urgent need to be aware of these dynamics, in particular of how identities play a crucial role in the process of ‘framing’ political issues.

Tudor Silva (University of Peradenya, Sri Lanka) pointed out that peace has to be built at every level of society so it is necessary to identify ‘openings’ for peace at global, regional, national, local and household levels. It is also important to understand the role various agents and agencies – such as media, religion and women’s groups – can have in building and facilitating a peace-making process. He also warned that it can be too simplistic to assume that exclusion is always imposed from above. This is often the case but exclusion can also emerge from below or from within.

Ruth Jacobson (University of Bradford, UK) wondered what people thought of the idea of calling these ‘reflection’ sessions ‘peace cabinets’. She acknowledged that the terms itself may suggest exclusion rather than inclusion as cabinet evokes association with cupboards and boxes, where you are either in or out. She suggested an appropriate definition would be perhaps ‘porous container’.

The discussion took up Ruth Jacobson’s suggestion and debated the meaning of ‘peace cabinet’. The prevailing impression within the audience was that the expression ‘peace cabinet’ was a way of using the rhetoric of war and turning it towards the achievement of peace. There were also a number of suggestions on the way forward in tackling the issues raised in the first two days of the conference:

- the potential to explore links between CODEP and other peace initiatives in order to increase effectiveness; also extended to organisations with different expertise so as to build on each other’s strengths
- develop a systematic approach to conflict prevention to overcome the narrow focus on specific conflicts with no regard for the similarities between them and the potential for learning from past experiences
- the need for dialogue, to connect the excluded groups to the elites and to ‘lift the lid’ to allow the expression of marginalised and oppressed identities
the need to focus on the increasingly sensitive issue of migration and asylum in the UK

Keynote Address

Guns and Tears in the Aceh Conflict

Bukhari Daud, lecturer and human rights worker at the Care Human Rights Foundation of Aceh, Indonesia addressed the audience with a presentation on the human rights violations in the Aceh conflict which is often underreported in the Western media but which had claimed thousands of victims. He called for people in Europe and beyond to join the struggle of the Acehnese people for peace and justice.

“We want change”

Daud started his presentation by giving some background information on the Aceh conflict. The fall of Suharto in May 1997 has ushered in what Indonesians call the ‘reformation era’, the popular mood is for a total change, for completely doing away with the legacy of the authoritarian regime. For the first time criticism of the government and the military was allowed. People held demonstrations at the public offices in the central capital and in the regional capitals, chanting “we want change”. This outpouring of emotions and anger has unfortunately also included some negative aspects. Robberies and arsons have occurred, especially directed against the ethnic Chinese community. He argued that people did not want to directly attack the Chinese community but the latter became the target, as they were perceived as linked to the authoritarian regime. With the progressive opening of the public sphere at the heart of the ‘Reformation’ era, revelations gradually emerged of the atrocities committed in Aceh during the period of the military repression (1989-1998). Thousands of people were killed and tortured. What does the ‘reformation era’ mean for Aceh? Essentially two big changes. First, the end of the military oppression – and of the gross human rights violations that came with it – in 1998 as a response to the armed rebel groups in Aceh. Second, the rise of a demand for a referendum on self-determination. In November 1999 close to two million people – more than half of Aceh’s population – assembled to demand a referendum. This is primarily a students-led demand and is seen as a compromise between the demands of the secessionist movement and the intransigent position of the central government in Jakarta. However no significant measures directed at redressing past injustices have been adopted.

“Why is there conflict in Aceh?”

The Acehnese conflict is not new. It dates back to at least 1949 when the Indonesian state was created. Aceh had been a country and kept a relative autonomy under the Dutch colonial regime. In 1949 Aceh voluntarily joined Indonesia but the central government has been unfair to Aceh ever since especially in the distribution of resources. Indonesia is an over-centralised state and regions
have no say at all. Land concessions to foreign companies to exploit natural resources are granted and managed by the central government with the total exclusion of the local population. In sharp contrast, if local people fell a tree they can be arrested for having damaged ‘state property’. In the early days of independence the then leader Sukarno asked Aceh for help with setting up diplomatic missions abroad. Aceh offered two aircraft on the promise that it would be granted a status of special autonomous region in return. The diplomatic missions were established and Sukarno granted Aceh the autonomous status. But after just four years he betrayed Aceh by merging it with a neighbouring region and effectively stripping it of its autonomy. A revolt followed which lasted until 1964. In the case of Aceh, the state instead of being a vehicle of security and prosperity has turned into an instrument of oppression and spoliation. Aceh is rich in natural resources but does not benefit from them because everything is centralised in Indonesia. Regions are totally dependent on the state.

Civilians caught in the ‘fire’

The government wanted to eradicate the rebel groups. After 10 years, they haven’t succeeded in that intent but they have just brought disaster. The civilians have paid the highest price for this repression. In the Aceh conflict there are four players:
- Indonesian security forces
- the (secessionist) Movement
- so-called unidentified people (euphemism for criminals)
- civilian people

The first three are armed while civilians are unarmed. The civilians’ position is very difficult as they are caught in the conflict between governmental forces and the rebels. Every day they confront armed control. If they collaborate with the military they face the hostility of the village and very possibly the revenge of the rebels who often are fellow villagers. If they refuse to collaborate with the security forces they risk being accused of helping the rebel groups and face the full wrath of the government forces. When the security forces enter a village and ask you “do you know such and such person (suspected to be a rebel)?” it is very difficult to answer “no” as that person is likely to be from your own village and you are bound to know him. The so-called ‘unidentified’ are ordinary criminals who take advantage of the situation and use arms for their own purposes. They would come round at your house at night carrying a gun and ask for your car or money. Or they would stop you on the road and rob you of your car. If you do not do what they want you put your life at risk. As a consequence of this conflict there are thousands of human rights violations. The new government has set up a commission of enquiry into the atrocities committed during the period of military repression. Daud gave some chilling examples of extreme brutality committed. Yet he claimed that those on the commission are often appalled by what they hear through testimonies but that once they go back to Jakarta they forget what they have heard.

Discussion
What are the roots of Aceh distinctive identity?

During the colonial period Indonesia did not exist. Aceh was an independent country before the Dutch arrived. Indonesian nationalism was defined by the reaction against colonialism. Aceh took part in the war of independence and decided to be part of Indonesia foregoing independence. Then oil and gas were discovered in Aceh. The industry developed with the total exclusion of the local population of Aceh. People say: “they are getting rich with my own land”. The crux is the injustice in the distribution of resources. The root is not religion. Acehnese share the same religion of the majority of Indonesians – Islam. The root is not ethnic, religious or linguistic but conflict over resources. The secessionist movement has mobilised Acehnese identity around the conflict over resources.

Is the army under political control?

Yes, the military is now under political control. There is a civilian minister of defence. A reform of the military is under way.

There are many similarities between Aceh and Palestine and Sudan. Israel is usually described as a democracy but behaves as authoritarian Indonesia. in Sudan, police and army are as brutal as in Aceh.

There are similarities but a key difference: violence is perpetrated by the same people not by outsiders

What about the democratisation process and decentralisation in Indonesia?

It is a fake decentralisation, a smoke-screen; it doesn’t address the substantial issues. The referendum was rejected because of fear of a domino-effect triggered by East Timor. The movement wants secession the government offered some autonomy and resource transfers. Both sides are unwilling to compromise.

What needs to be done to defuse the conflict?

- Bring those responsible for the atrocities to court whoever they are
- The central government should work with the Acehnese population for a peaceful solution
- Improve the economy. Offer compensation to those who suffered under the military repression.
- Outside help: many HR workers and little problems in Europe, few workers and many problems in Indonesia: “come and join us”. 
Workshops

Exclusion/Inclusion: Africa

Adamu Alhassan Bonaa of the International Youth Development Foundation and Pamela Ateka, a Kenyan artist, facilitated a workshop addressing the interplay between exclusion and inclusion in African societies.

On entering the workshop, members of the audience were asked to take one shoe off.

Education and exclusion in Africa

Adamu Alhassan Bonaa thanked the organisers for having provided a platform for African issues. He devoted his talk to the issue of conflict, war and political unrest in Africa. He argued that Western models of democracy and development assistance which have been imposed on Africa have in fact contributing to generating conflict on the continent. A clear example is provided by the conflict in Ghana in which ethnic and clan rivalries have been exacerbated by the competitive election process. Democratic procedures imported wholesale from the West can have harmful consequences in the African context. These consequences primarily stem from the lack of participation and information on the part of ordinary people which allow people in power to manipulate the political process. The elites exclude the rest of the population from any share of the resources and corruption is widespread, especially regarding the management of aid from Western countries. In turn, low levels of information and participation are closely linked to low levels of education. The International Youth Development Foundation has been set up to tackle this problem of lack of education among young people. The Foundation groups a small number of participants – it is thus not representative of African civil society – who use it as a forum for exchanging ideas and networking. Sometimes, even efforts to improve education and inclusion of young people can turn into occasion for conflict. In Nigeria, for instance, a selection process prior to a Youth Programme Conference led to riots among the students which were brutally repressed by the police. In Ghana, where Alhassan Bonaa has been working for many years in the youth and student movement, the decision to introduce tuition fees for schools and universities has been highly controversial and has contributed to the sense of injustice felt by the people. Most of the students come from very poor families and resent having to pay fees while elite children are educated abroad and come back to impose their rule on the country. In this case too, peaceful demonstrations and petitions were brutally repressed by the police. The financial dimension of the right to education is one of the main sources of conflict in Africa and it is made worse by the fact that the youth and student movements which should be part of the political process are in fact excluded from it.

Discussion
CODEP Conference 2002

- Is there any pan-African networking among students?

  Yes, but it does not work since the Organisation of African States does not recognise it despite the network having received UN recognition.

- Is the student movement not too aggressive and ‘Western’ in outlook?

  Not really, it is based in West Africa, though there has been discussion about moving the HQ to London for organisational reasons.

**Artistic performance**

*Pamela Ateka* gave an artistic performance, reciting a poem and singing folk-songs in between. After the performance, the audience was asked to split into three groups which were given the tasks of working on three questions.

**Group 1**  What are the core issues of the story?

The group felt that the following issues had emerged: frustration, lack of control, hatred, despair, hope, hunger, inequality.

**Group 2**  How to solve all these problems?

The group suggested the following: leadership, accountability of elites, positive rewards, encouragement.

**Group 3**  How could you relate these issues to yourself and the countries you come from?

A woman from Sudan stated that she could very well relate to the issue raised by the performance. She spoke about the frustration felt at the lack of education and the government’s refusal to negotiate. She also spoke of the sense of injustice and exclusion as Sudan is a resource-rich country but there is shortage of arable land and demographic pressures. She argued that only new methods of production could give some opportunities to the youth.

At the end of the group session, everyone was asked to select one shoe other than one’s own from the heap and to find, first, the person who was wearing the other shoe of their pair and, second, the person whose shoe one was wearing. Upon completion of this task members of the audience were asked to hold each other hands with their partners wearing the other shoe. The moderator concluded the workshop saying that this is the way we should deal with different identities: we should recognise and communicate with each other even though a different shoe sometimes does not fit.
**Inclusion/Exclusion: Balkans & CIS**

*John Cockell*, researcher at the LSE and formerly with the UN mission in Kosovo and *Pamela Young*, regional coordinator for Oxfam ran a workshop focused on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the international efforts put in place to deal with the aftermath.

**Oxfam’s work in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus**

Pamela Young reported on the work conducted by Oxfam in the region. Oxfam is organised in regional centres. The centre for Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union and the Middle East is based in Oxford. Oxfam elaborates policies and does advocacy work through local offices in Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania and Serbia. Oxfam’s work is focused on supporting marginalised populations throughout the region and in the Balkan area in particular. Main problems that need to be addressed:

- Widespread corruption
- No access to trade
- Lack of political participation
- Displacement of people due to conflict (many people living in camps, collective centres)
- Poverty

People most marginalised:

- Women; they have often been separated from men prior to or during the displacement; Oxfam supports women in finding work and look after the children
- Elderly; pensions have usually been eaten out by high inflation and economic dislocation
- Disabled; there is little support for disabled people in all these countries. For instance, Oxfam has set up a recorded library in Azerbaijan.
- Children; they are most at risk; they have often been separated from their fathers, they face disruption to the their education as a result of displacement, they have often been traumatised by witnessing crimes, have access to weapons and are particularly vulnerable to landmines.
- Minorities; especially Roma; have been displaced by conflict and are often victims of ‘hidden displacement’ that goes unreported.

In all these cases Oxfam provides immediate support but also tries to change policies. A prominent example is the case of the policies facilitating the return of refugees. This is done through direct action programmes, lobbying of governments and international organisations to bring about policy change and collaborate with NGOs active in the area. In the near future, Oxfam wants to move in two main directions. First, to do more work on the issue of small arms. Second, to help strengthen international humanitarian law dealing with conflict situations, in
particular as it regards refugees. The urgency of the latter is clearly demonstrated by the situation in Kosovo where refugee-return has been unsatisfactory so far.

**The roots of the Kosovo conflict**

John Cockell drew on his experience with the UN mission to analyse the case of the Kosovo conflict. The conflict in Kosovo has to be understood in the overall context of the ethnic-Albanian populations of South-Eastern Europe. Ethnic Albanians live in rump-Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Kosovo), in Macedonia as well as in Albania. From this dispersion in various states many problems arise. However, partly because of the internal political and economic problems in Albania, the ‘mother country’ has adopted a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the Albanian minorities in the neighbouring states. The main problem faced by these Albanian minorities is that, due to their separate identity vis-à-vis the Slavic majorities, they have largely been excluded from the respective mainstream societies and subjected to systematic discrimination. There were very little interaction between the Albanian and the Slavic populations. Kosovo was the archetypal case of exclusion in which an overwhelming majority in the region had no control on government, apart from the period 1974-1989 during which Kosovo enjoyed considerable autonomy as a *de facto* component republic of the Yugoslav federation. In 1989 Milosevic removed Kosovo’s autonomy and started a policy of harassment and oppression of the Albanians. This was directed at stripping Albanians of their identity, many Kosovars were forced to leave their job. In 1990 the regional assembly voted in favour of a republic status and in response was shut down by the Serbian government. An unofficial referendum on independence registered 95 per cent consensus on secession. Kosovars reacted to the Serbian oppression by trying to establish a sort of parallel government running schools and hospitals but soon the difficulties of such an operation became evident. Kosovars had to deal with heavy police presence with people being arbitrarily arrested and detained. This situation led to the emergence of organised military resistance and in the summer of 1998 the conflict escalated. Governmental repression was step up with the army taking over the central role from the police. At the Rambouillet summit the NATO countries tried to reach an agreement with Serbia but the latter rejected it. This rejection led to the NATO bombing campaign the following spring. Cockell stressed that the crucial point is that identity marginalisation leads to protracted violence and Kosovo is a clear example. The KLA was set up in 1992-3 but only enjoyed widespread support in 1998-9.

**Discussion**

- **Prospect of Kosovo independence**

  Kosovars do not want to return under Serbia, international community tries to defuse the issue

- **Trafficking of women and KFOR complicity; reform of police and justice system**
Inclusion/Exclusion: India, Pakistan, South Asia

Katsu Masaki, researcher at Sussex University and Tudor Silva of the University of Peradenya in Sri Lanka ran a workshop focused on the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in South Asia.

Maoist insurgency and political mobilisation in Nepal

Katsu Masaki talked about his experience while doing fieldwork for his doctoral research in two villages in Nepal. He was concerned with assessing the impact of the Maoist insurgency on village life and politics. The Maoist insurgency started in 1996 with the aim of challenging a corrupt and oppressive state and ten percent of the Nepalese population is now believed to be under Maoist control. The conflict is exacting a heavy toll on the population which suffers from hardship and insecurity. After an attempt by the government to reach an agreement with the guerrilla movement failed, the state of emergency was declared in November 2001. The conflict is complicated by the presence of trans-border influences linked to the rivalry between India and Pakistan. The Maoist guerrilla receives support from ultra-leftist organisations in India and the Indian government turns a blind eye on the connection, also offering a safe haven to Maoist leaders. At the same time India blames Pakistan for the insurgency and tries to conceal its own involvement. Masaki argued that India is trying to play a greater role in Nepal’s security affairs by accusing Pakistan of being covertly involved. In addition to instability imported from the dispute between its neighbours, Nepal also suffers from internally-generated instability. The local population with disillusioned with democracy, which it sees as having failed to deliver what people desired. Moreover, social and ethnic divisions are compounded by widespread poverty and deprivation. All these factors created a large constituency within Nepalese society receptive to the ideas put forward by the Maoist rebels. Masaki pointed out that conflict can sometimes have positive repercussions on society. In the case of Nepal, it has put pressure on marginalised groups to get together and react to the worsening of their situation. He identified four main marginal groups: ethnic minorities, landless people, bonded labourers and women. He also stressed that the marginal groups’ attempt to redress their grievances has not led to a reversal of positions but there has been some progress. These positive changes have not taken place everywhere in Nepal nor have they affected all marginalised groups but the conflict can be seen as having given a spur to the political mobilisation of these groups. Masaki concluded his talk arguing that the case of Nepal indicates that there are more actors involved in conflict than just the warring parties and that conflict creates opportunities for alternative forms of political mobilisation. From the perspective of external intervention, this dynamics points to the necessity to give support to those groups – such as the marginalised groups in Nepal – which attempt to manage conflict in a non-violent way.

Poverty, ethnicity and conflict in Sri Lanka
Tudor Silva focused his intervention on the links between poverty and ethnicity in the Sri Lankan conflict and how they affect social exclusion. He began his talk with defining poverty on the basis of socio-economic criteria and ethnicity on how people perceive themselves and identify with. Sri Lanka’s population totals 18 million, with the following composition by ethnic group in percentage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sinhalese</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan Tamil</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Tamil</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is violent conflict between the security forces of the Sri Lankan government – largely staffed by Sinhalese – and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the radical movement of the Tamil minority. The Tamils of Indian origins are not involved in the conflict. The armed conflict started in 1983 and has progressively eroded a large share of the government’s budget. In 2001 the Sri Lanka government devoted the equivalent of over 5 per cent of the country’s GDP to security expenses. On a theoretical level, Silva argued, a link between poverty and violent conflict is generally acknowledged. However, he pointed out that there is also poverty without conflict, conflict without poverty and, more importantly, mutual reinforcement between conflict and poverty. The relationship between poverty and conflict is thus a complex one. Ethnicity can be seen as an intervening variable in the poverty/conflict nexus. Research conducted by the Centre for Poverty Analysis found that ethnicity is connected in three main ways to poverty and conflict. First, it is used by deprived sectors of the population as a framework for understanding their ethnicity. Secondly, it is used by impoverished and displaced populations as a coping mechanism to build ethnic-based support networks. But, thirdly, it is also used by elite groups as a means for creating intra-group identity across class divisions and thus secure broader support for their ends. These patterns also emerged from Silva’s own ethnographic research on Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim displaced populations in Sri Lanka. Ethnicity had a clear influence in the way the different groups perceived their situations. Displaced Tamils see the government’s security forces as the prime cause of their suffering while displaced Sinhalese and Muslim blame the LTTE for their displacement and distress. Silva argued that both the security forces and the insurgents are responsible for the displacement and the differences in perceptions are due to ethnicity being used as a common framework for understanding injustices and evils in the social system. Ethnicity in Sri Lanka is consciously manipulated by all parties engaged in the conflict. In turn, conflict reinforces ethnic identities, ethnic segregation and prejudices as previously fluid identities give way to a more exclusive identification with the ethnic groups at the expense of regional, local, religious and gender identities. By way of this process the manipulation of identities by the parties in conflict generates deeper social exclusion. The use of ethnicity as a coping mechanism was also very much present in the Sri Lankan context. Displaced people build social networks to support one another and are often helped and housed by relatives. People look to leaders of their own ethnic group to provide
relief for those displaced from their villages and ethnic-based diaspora groups facilitate migration abroad. Silva then concluded that the Sri Lanka case shows how ethnicity can be used to fuel conflict around poverty and deprivation; therefore where poverty and ethnicity are fused conflict is more likely. Furthermore, in ethnically charged settings relative poverty is often more significant than absolute poverty as it is more readily exploitable by conflict entrepreneurs for their political ends. For these reasons, a comprehensive approach addressing conflict resolution, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and poverty reduction within a unified framework is needed is conflict is to be overcome.

Discussion

The moderator – Maria Lall – gave a brief overview of the dispute between India and Pakistan and the likelihood that it would lead to open war, perhaps with use of nuclear weapons.

- What is the role played by conflict entrepreneurs in the economic dimension of conflict situation?

  Silva: in areas under military control, trade permits are usually granted by the armed forces, so conflict entrepreneurs tend to have an economic interest in sustaining conflict. They are also likely to exploit the conflict to improve the economic position of their own ethnic group with the result of further fuelling conflict through the interaction of poverty and ethnicity.

- The end of conflict and demilitarisation would lead to unemployment for many Sinhalese people of lower middle class background, what are the implications?

  Very significant. The impact would be huge. This is a further illustration of the perverse nature of the nexus between poverty, ethnicity and conflict.

Inclusion/Exclusion: Latin America

Gabriela Alvarez Minte of the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo de la Mujer in Chile run a workshop focused on the dichotomy inclusion/exclusion in Latin America and its connection to worldwide developments.

Inclusion and exclusion in globalised Latin America

Alvarez Minte discussed the differences between the various Latin American countries but also the commonalities between them, in particular their shared experience of neo-liberal economic reforms over the last twenty years. She also addressed the topic of globalisation which she conceptualised as an inclusion/exclusion mechanism. Globalisation is a form of inclusion is that it brings
economic growth, access to new technologies and to the world beyond one’s own country but it is a form of exclusion at the same time because it increases inequalities and leaves a section of the population without access to its benefits. In certain contexts, such as Argentina and Venezuela, it can also have a negative political impact as it threatens democratic governance. The dual – inclusion/exclusion – nature of globalisation can also be seen in the cultural sphere where an ‘inclusive’ universalization of principles such as human rights has gone hand in hand with the ‘exclusive’ proliferation of segmented identities – children, women, indigenous groups. The inclusion/exclusion dynamics in the cultural sphere has also repercussions on political life as new identities and ‘group rights’ associated with them demand recognition at the political level. The sharpest effects of globalisation have naturally made themselves felt in the economic sphere where, Alvarez Minte argued, Latin American countries have mainly experienced exclusion from the process of development, both at the country level and – more particularly – at the social level, with large sections of the population increasingly marginalised.

Alvarez Minte emphasised that the large inequality existing in Latin America is one of the most important problem the region is facing. This inequality is in constant tension with the economic model currently prevailing and puts a great strain on democracy and stability. It is lived daily as a burden by millions of people who perceive it as the manifestation of “arbitrariness”. In certain countries – such as Chile – where the growth of the economy and of people’s expectations has been among the fastest, inequality is pushing people towards a form of extreme consumerism, beyond level of affordability and thus financed through higher and higher levels of debt.

Globalisation and the hegemony of the neo-liberal economic model centred on a minimal role of the state are particularly problematic in the Latin American context because they weaken the state’s capacity to redress inequality through vigorous public policies. The latter are essential if economic growth is to benefit the bulk of the population in Latin America. She concluded her intervention stating that to truly bring about inclusion it is necessary to move beyond a conception of human rights as rights of powerful white males towards a conception that recognise the distinctiveness of many different human groups. In this light we should welcome the rise of movement claiming recognition for the rights of women, children and indigenous groups – such as the Zapatista movement in Mexico.

Discussion

- Human rights are meant to apply to everyone, so why do we need to differentiate?

Human rights – as first defined at the time of the French revolution – meant rights of males. Only later have they been applied to women and others. The problem arises when one tries to apply a stereotype to very different situations: it doesn’t work. This has frequently happened in Latin America, for example in the implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms throughout the region from the mid-1980s, notably in Mexico and Chile.
Human rights cannot be applied equally to everyone because there is a large difference between the powerful and the non-powerful.

Yes, there is also an area of human rights not well established: cultural and social rights.

How does citizenship come into this debate?

It doesn’t really, civil society is very weak in Latin America – though Argentina is different, difficult to generalise –, citizenship is replaced by consumption as the dominant mode of inclusion; public debate dominated by economic issues; no desire to examine the authoritarian past; very little political mobilisation; people do not feel represented by the government; democracy needs to become more inclusive; states are weak while markets are now very powerful.

Role of EU and US in the region and differences in approach between the two; Europeans perceived as more sensitive to social and environmental issues; desire for greater European involvement.

Latin America largely excluded from European horizon; little attention paid in the media even to such events as the coup in Venezuela and the crisis in Argentina; little interests by governments; democratisation – e.g. in Chile – had the effect of reducing international attention.

Role of the Church:

Some have taken a position against liberal economic policies – legacy of the liberation theology movement – but the Church as a whole has become more conservative and it is still closely allied to the dominant groups in society: government and military. The Church could potentially have a very important role given its huge infrastructure.

Women’s movement

Still at the embryonic stage. In Chile largely confined to the academic world. Often more concerned with democracy issues than gender issues.

Inclusion/Exclusion: Indonesia

Arifah Rahmawati of Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia ran a workshop focused on the dichotomy inclusion/exclusion in Indonesia and its connection to worldwide developments.
The nature of the conflict

The speaker started her intervention mentioning that the President of Indonesia declared in London that conflict in Indonesia is small. This assertion triggered a debate within the audience on the truth of such a statement. Many expressed doubts that this is the case, on the ground that the international media have not been allowed into Indonesia and the local press does not report on conflict in the country. Rahmawati stated that issues appear clear-cut at conferences or workshops but are much less clear-cut on the ground in Indonesia. The most important source of conflict is the tension between Muslims and Christians. This dates back to the colonial period when Christians enjoyed a privileged position – notably in access to education – closely linked to the colonial administration while Muslims became marginalised. The latter had little choice but to work in agriculture, a socio-economic position perceived as humiliating in the Muslim culture. The tension latent in this socio-economic inequality between Christians and Muslims has been compounded by Muslim reluctance to work with the ‘unbelievers’.

The role of the military

The economic crisis in Indonesia affects especially peripheral islands such as Maluku and Angon. In those islands up to 40 per cent of economic development depends on the central government which is perceived to be strongly influenced by Christians. Moreover, the professions are also dominated by Christians. These circumstances fuel the tensions between the two groups. Regional governments are very weak and unable to solve the situation. This task falls primarily on the military that tries to impose its control to solve the conflict, approached from a very narrow understanding of security. To do so the military makes people feel that they need the presence of the armed forces, it imposes curfews and terrorises the civilian population who is desperate for physical security. The military is badly prepared for the task, there is constant rotation of commanders and no training for peacekeeping is provided. As a result, the military intervention has failed to resolve the conflict and, especially, to build reconciliation at the grass-roots level. Top-down peace-making initiatives have had little success so far but there is optimism among the people that there will be some progress soon. This is despite the fact that the local press has a negative impact on the relationship between the two religious groups by exaggerating the degree of conflict.

The roots of the conflict

There is no single cause for the conflict. Among the factors at play there is internal migration which upsets the balance between the religious groups and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. To a certain extent Islam in South-East Asia is influenced by the developments in Middle-Eastern Islam. Religious extremism also receives local funding as conflict ‘entrepreneurs’ use religion as a mobilising element to rally support in a context of weak state structure. An important background factor is also the instability brought about by the collapse of the Suharto regime and the reaction against the high level of corruption in the political system. The central government’s attempt to tackle the conflict in a centralised and uniform way has
backfired as it is unable to control the army and it is perceived as unrepresentative by the people. The result has been deeper resentment and a worsening of the conflict. A combination of low salary and the feeling of power deriving from the use of weapons makes the military a dangerous force, especially when political control is ineffective. This policy should be reversed and regional governments empowered with the aim of laying the foundations of a genuine federal system.

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**Peace Cabinet**

**Roundtable: Looking Ahead**

**Chris Dolon:** liked very much the performance in one of the workshops. Reminded him of how to communicate. Throughout the conference there was a lot of talk but little was achieved. Performance succeeded in communicate a great deal in just 5 minutes.

**Pamela Ateka repeated her performance.**

Comments from the audience raised the question of why having a ‘peace cabinet’ at all and suggested that membership of the cabinet should be open to the audience and not just restricted to network members.

**Ruth Jacobson:** conference deepened her sense of terror and despair as a non-Zionist Jew. It seemed to her that little advance had been made on identity and that identities were still often tied to religions. She reaffirmed her belief that there must be a place for a secular identity, though this need not be defined along Western lines to avoid the fate of modernisation which has tried to impose Western model on the rest of the world. She also reflected on the inherent difficulty in how to decide who are the excluded and the marginalised. She thought the issue of the role of military and security forces – including police – is a key issue and she would like CODEP to do more on that. In that respect she saw Northern Ireland as giving some hope of overcoming conflict and discrimination.

**Tudor Silva:** he observed the conference through the eyes of a sociologist concerned with processes of exclusion at the national and international level. He pointed out that exclusionary processes are group processes and are always interactive processes. For instance, the military reacts against the rebels and the latter react in turn. It is essential to analyse these processes from both side if we are to make sense of them. He felt that the issue of ethnicity was not much discussed. He observed that there are different definitions of ethnicity and that ethnicity is often mobilised around issues of economic resources and poverty. Therefore, ethnicity by itself does not fully explain conflict, conflicts are usually more widely rooted, especially in economic grievances. He also stressed that in conflict situations there are multiple identities involved, not only ethnic but also gender identities. He also thought that the conference demonstrated that there is
no single formula for peace, different solutions need to be applied to different conflict. There is no “one size fits all” solution. However, although situations are different there is scope for learning and this is were a network such as CODEP can really add value. The conference raised lots of questions that require further analysis.

**Discussion**

- What is the role of the mass media in this?

  It’s very important, also in generating identities and perceptions of identities

- Identity was very much perceived as something fixed rather than fluid and changing.

  Identities also analysed as fluid. It’s so difficult to discuss identities. It has different meaning to different people. It is used by both strong and weak people. It’s a “double edged sword”. Some identities cut across borders.

- There was too much focus on the military and on security issues. One commentator felt that economic and climatic issues are crucial and deserved more attention.

  Yes, last year’s conference focused on that but there is the need to go further

- Why not doing a conference of this kind in a place where there is real exclusion and discrimination going on?

- It would be good to have more performances

- There should be more emphasis on the future and on the actions we need to take rather than analysis of the past. We should be studying the conflict entrepreneurs and the sources of conflict.

- There are many organisations working in this area, there is a need for consolidating their activities. CODEP can be instrumental in this process.

- There is the need to evaluate conflict transformation programmes. How do we evaluate programmes? We need to develop criteria and methods and persuade donors to take this into account.

- It is important to carry the message forward. The process should not end with this conference. The network can and should act as a disseminator.