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## Original Article

# Europeanization and the unravelling of Belgium: A comparative analysis of party strategies

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**Abstract** Research on Europeanization has greatly deepened our understanding of the domestic impact of European integration but has largely neglected the question of the extent to which it has influenced domestic politics in relation to state reform. The article addresses this question by investigating the case of Belgium, which has experienced the deepest process of state reform and at the same time has been the most exposed to Europeanization. It explores the connections between the two through a qualitative comparative analysis of the degree to which political parties have exploited the European dimension in their rhetorical strategies on state reform, with focus on three key time points. The results paint a contrasting picture. On the one hand, the degree of Europeanization has been limited at each point in time and largely stable over time. On the other hand, the VU/N-VA stands out as a major exception for its consistent – and growing – exploitation of the European dimension. The analysis shows that constitutional preferences, importance of the constitutional question and attitudes to integration are the key factors explaining the patterns observed. These findings call for deeper theorization of the domestic impact of integration and point to avenues for further comparative analysis.

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‘Wij willen Vlamingen zijn, om Europeërs te worden’  
August Vermeulen, 1900<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

There has been growing academic interest over the last decade in the domestic impact of European integration, a process referred to as Europeanization. The

Europeanization research agenda aims to cover the full spectrum of the influence that the EU has on its states, across the fields of institutional structures, political behaviour and public policy. While the latter aspect has attracted most attention, however, the question of the degree to which the European dimension has influenced party politics and institutional change has not been subject to much investigation.

This is notably the case with regard to processes of ‘vertical’ state reform, which have seen devolution of power to regional and local governments and in some cases even a constitutional transformation into a federal or quasi-federal system. To what extent has the politics of such processes been influenced by Europeanization? This question touches upon both the ‘politics’ and the ‘polity’ aspects of Europeanization research as it concerns the degree to which political actors have Europeanized their strategies to bring about institutional change.

As discussed at greater length below, nowhere more than in the case of Belgium is this question relevant, as the country has undergone the most profound state reform in Western Europe and at the same time has been at the heart of European integration. Belgium thus presents itself as an ideal case for the purpose of investigating the degree to which the politics of state reform has been influenced by the European dimension.

This article does so on the basis of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the rhetorical strategies of political parties – the main drivers of Belgium’s state reform – seeking to ascertain the extent to which these were Europeanized, understood here as linking the European dimension to state reform, and which factors were necessary or sufficient, individually or collectively, to produce the degree of Europeanization observed. The results paint a contrasting picture. On the one hand, the Europeanization of party strategies has been limited at each point in time and largely stable over time. On the other hand, the *Volksunie/Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie*<sup>2</sup> stands out as a major exception for its consistent, and growing, exploitation of the European dimension. Constitutional preferences, importance of the constitutional question and attitudes to integration appear to be the most important factors accounting for this variation.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: the next section reviews the literature that informs the research presented here and outlines the theoretical framework on which it is based; the subsequent section describes the research design and the methodology employed; the latter section presents the empirical results; finally, the penultimate section and the concluding one discuss the insights offered by the Belgian case and their significance in the wider debate on how European integration influences domestic politics.



## Europeanization, State Reform and the Belgian Case

The study of the domestic impact of European integration started in the late 1960s-early 1970s (Cardon de Lichtbuer, 1967; Wallace, 1971) and developed in earnest in the first decade of this century, with the publication of several general works (Hix and Goetz, 2000; Cowles *et al.*, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005, pp. 281–391; Graziano and Vink, 2007; Ladrech, 2010) as well as a number of more specialized studies.

Although the lion's share of the Europeanization literature has focussed on public policy, a number of studies have dealt with the EU's influence on state structures (see reviews in Kassim, 2005; Bursens, 2007). A significant proportion of these have specifically addressed its impact on the politics of state-regions relations (for example, Bache and Jones, 2000; Börzel, 2002; Sturm and Dieringer, 2005; Fleurke and Willemse, 2006; Bursens and Deforche, 2008; Ladrech, 2010, pp. 92–113). A key finding of these studies is that the EU can have a discernible influence on how state and regional governments interact by inducing more cooperative relations between them.

The extent to which European integration has had an influence on the creation or strengthening of regional governments through state reform, on the other hand, has been less well researched, despite having been first touched upon in the mid-1970s (Feld, 1975). The question has mainly been addressed within theoretical works of a wider scope, most of which have postulated a positive correlation between integration and devolution of power to regional and local governments. Different authors emphasize different factors as having had the main causal effect, including the institutional architecture of the EU (Birch, 1978, p. 336), economic integration (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003, pp. 213–214) and the structural funds (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, pp. 81–118; Bartolini, 2005, pp. 260–264). With the exception of a study of Scottish devolution in the United Kingdom (Dardanelli, 2005, 2009), however, there has not been much systematic empirical investigation of this question.

This is rather puzzling as the growing literature on regionalist parties' attitudes to European integration (Lynch, 1996, pp. 106–134; De Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2002; Jolly, 2007; Adamson and Johns, 2008; Laible, 2008, pp. 121–148; Elias, 2009; Hepburn, 2010) has also found that such parties – for whom achieving regional autonomy through state reform is the paramount aim – have often seen the EU as an ally offering a favourable external support structure for the pursuit of their objectives. One of the key findings of this literature is that it is necessary to distinguish between attitudes to European integration as an idea and attitudes to the existing EU, as the two can diverge sharply. Dardanelli (2005, 2009) also found that outsider parties are more likely to use 'Europe' as a heresthetical device in competition over

state reform and that attitudes to integration and to the EU are important intervening variables.

From the existing literature thus emerges that there are good theoretical reasons to expect European integration to have an influence on the politics of state reform, that political parties engaged in competition over such reforms can be expected to incorporate the European dimension in their strategies, and that conditions such as outsider status, focus on constitutional issues and positive attitudes to integration and/or the EU are likely to facilitate the 'Europe'-state reform linkage. Empirically investigating to what extent parties do so and which conditions shape their actions is thus a fruitful line of analysis.

Belgium suggests itself as a crucial case for such an analysis because it displays maximum 'values' on three key variables: state reform, exposure to European integration and party dominance. Although most European countries have experienced some form of devolution of power since 1950, only in some cases – Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – has the process gone as far as a constitutional transformation into a federal or quasi-federal state (Hooghe *et al*, 2008). Even among the latter, Belgium stands out because it displays clear 'confederal' traits and continues to experience pressures for further fragmentation to an extent unmatched anywhere else in Europe (De Winter and Baudewyns, 2009). At the same time, it has been at the heart of the process of integration, hence the most exposed to Europeanization, for the following reasons: (1) as one of the founding countries, it has been a member of the EU for the longest period of time; (2) it is geographically located at the centre of the EU; (3) it hosts most of the key EU institutions; (4) it has consistently been pro-integration (Coolsaet, 1998).<sup>3</sup> Last, but not least, the Belgian political parties enjoy a dominant position within the system with a few parallels elsewhere, to the point that the polity is often described as a *particratie* (for example, Deschouwer, 1999). Belgium thus offers the best opportunity to investigate to what extent – and under which conditions – parties Europeanize the politics of state reform.

Yet, the literature on Belgium has so far largely neglected this question. While the main accounts of the process of federalization tend not to factor the European dimension in their analysis (for example, Hooghe, 2004; De Winter and Baudewyns, 2009), both contributions that deal with Belgium-EU relations (for example, Hooghe, 1995; Kerremans and Beyers, 1996, 1997; Coolsaet, 1998; Kerremans, 2000; Bursens, 2004) and those adopting an explicit Europeanization perspective (Bursens, 2002; Franck *et al*, 2003; Beyers and Bursens, 2006; Bursens and Deforche, 2008) generally take Belgium's federal structure as given and do not investigate the degree to which the EU influenced the politics of state reform from a 'dynamic' perspective. De Bandt (1992) is, to the author's knowledge, the only one to have addressed



the question of the ‘European’ influence on Belgian federalization more directly but he did not conduct a systematic analysis to answer it. He concluded (1992, p. 136) that ‘The European Community has not exerted any influence on the Belgian federalization process’. In contrast, Cardon de Lichtbuer’s (1967, p. 589) expectation 25 years before had been that integration would likely lead to ‘a reversion to nationalism, or more likely Flemish/Walloon regionalism’ unless a federal European state were established.

As mentioned above, the present article intends to contribute to our understanding of Europeanization through an investigation of party strategies over state reform in Belgium. The theoretical framework underpinning the analysis is based on four fundamental assumptions. First, that in liberal-democratic systems processes of state reform are primarily the product of bargaining among political parties; hence, parties are the key actors driving such processes. As mentioned above, this is particularly the case in Belgium. Second, if European integration fuels state reform because it provides incentives and opportunities that favour it, we would expect political parties demanding reform to exploit it in their rhetorical strategies so as to strengthen the appeal of their demands *vis-à-vis* the electorate. Third, rhetorical strategies are the principal means through which political parties try to shape public opinion and persuade voters to support them and their core policies (for example, Breuning and Ishiyama, 1998). Fourth, if the exploitation of the European dimension in relation to state reform resonates with voters and brings electoral rewards to the parties employing it, the latter would be in a stronger bargaining position to bring reform about. Party strategies can thus be seen as the key causal mechanism linking the European dimension to domestic change.

On this basis, the article seeks to answer the following research questions:

- Q1: To what extent have the Belgian parties exploited the European dimension in their rhetorical strategies over state reform?
- Q2: What factors account for variation across parties in doing so?
- Q3: What factors account for variation over time in doing so?

As outlined in the following section, factors hypothesized to be causally connected to an outcome are called ‘conditions’ in QCA terminology. Relations between conditions and outcome are conceptualized in terms of ‘set relations’ whereby the researcher seeks to establish which condition or configuration of conditions is sufficient or necessary to produce the outcome. Seven conditions have been identified as likely to have a causal connection with Europeanization, as defined above, and lead to the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Party system status (C1 – *sysstat*): an ‘outsider’ status, defined as one characterized by a low probability of entering a

governing coalition, should be conducive to a Europeanization strategy as the latter might appear as an attractive competitive ‘weapon’ to an outsider party. Hence, low membership in the set of ‘insider parties’, should be connected to high membership in the set of parties with a Europeanized strategy.

**Hypothesis 2:** ‘Absolute’ constitutional position (C2 – *acopos*): a demand for high regional autonomy should be conducive to a Europeanization strategy as European integration is likely to be seen as a facilitator of regionalization. Hence, high membership in the set of parties demanding regional autonomy should be connected to high membership in the set of parties with a Europeanized strategy.

**Hypothesis 3:** Constitutional position relative to the *status quo* (C3 – *recopos*): a radical constitutional position, defined as relative to the constitutional *status quo*, should be conducive to a Europeanization strategy on the same grounds as above. Hence, high membership in the set of parties with a radical autonomist position should be connected to high membership in the set of parties with a Europeanized strategy.

**Hypothesis 4:** Importance of the constitutional question (C4 – *impon*): in a similar manner as H2 and H3, high importance of the constitutional question should also be conducive to a Europeanization strategy. Hence, high membership in the set of parties giving high importance to the constitutional question should be connected to high membership in the set of parties with a Europeanized strategy.

**Hypothesis 5:** Depth of European integration (C5 – *integ*): deeper integration should make the European dimension more salient and should thus be conducive to a Europeanization strategy. Hence, high membership in the integration set should be connected to high membership in the set of parties with a Europeanized strategy.

**Hypothesis 6:** Attitudes to integration (C6 – *attint*): parties with a positive attitude to integration should be more likely to adopt a Europeanization strategy. Hence, high membership in the set of parties with positive attitudes to integration should be connected to high membership in the set of parties with a Europeanized strategy.

**Hypothesis 7:** Attitudes to the EU<sup>4</sup> (C7 – *atteu*): likewise, parties with a positive attitude to the EU should be more likely to adopt a



Europeanization strategy. Hence, high membership in the set of parties with positive attitudes to the EU should be connected to high membership in the set of parties with a Europeanized strategy.

None of these conditions is individually expected to be sufficient to produce the outcome but a configuration of them is likely to be. High and/or radical autonomy demands combined to positive attitudes to integration, in particular, is hypothesized to be sufficient.

## Research Design and Methods

The analysis is based on a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) approach. QCA seeks to combine the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative approaches by using deep, case-focused knowledge to analyse complex causation and reach parsimonious modest generalizations. The fuzzy set variant of QCA, moreover, is centred on the notion of ‘degrees of membership’ in categories – ‘sets’ – and allows for a more fine-grained measurement and calibration of variables. The causal connections between conditions and outcomes are conceptualized in terms of ‘set relations’, whereby degrees of membership in the set of cases displaying the outcome is analysed in relation to degrees of membership in the set of cases sharing the condition/s. This is done in particular by identifying which conditions or ‘configurations’ of conditions are sufficient and/or necessary to produce the outcome under investigation (Ragin, 2008; Berg-Schlosser *et al*, 2009). It is thus a particularly useful approach in small-N research with qualitative data such as the project presented here.

The parties selected for analysis are those belonging to the four main ‘families’: Christian-democrat, socialist, liberal and nationalist.<sup>5</sup> To assess the effect of deepening integration over time, the rhetorical strategies of these parties have been observed at three key points in time: the late 1960s-early 1970s, the early 1990s and the late 2000s. As summarized in Table 1, these time points have been selected because they are characterized by critical junctures in both European integration and the process of state reform in Belgium and are thus the periods in which a Europeanization effect, as defined above, is most likely to have taken place.

Taking into account the changes undergone by the parties over the course of the period under examination (Deschouwer, 2009, pp. 73–105), this gives a total of 22 cases (Table A1).

The degree to which parties Europeanized their rhetorical strategies at each point in time has been estimated through qualitative content analysis of their

**Table 1:** Time points

<i>Time point</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>European integration</i>	<i>State reform in Belgium</i>
T1	1968–1971	Completion of customs union; re-launch of integration at The Hague summit; plans for monetary union	Initiation of process, revision of constitution, creation of communities and regions
T2	1991–1993	Maastricht treaty; start of monetary union process	Formal transformation into federal state
T3	2007–2010	Eastern enlargement; Lisbon treaty	Government crises, rise of N-VA, debate on further reform

*Note:* See Dinan (2010, pp. 9–167) and Deschouwer (2009, pp. 42–54) for concise outlines of European integration and Belgian state reform, respectively.

manifestos for the key election in each period – March 1968, November 1991 and June 2010, respectively – as well as supplementary sources such as congress resolutions and other party documents. Sentences linking the European dimension to state reform have been taken as evidence of Europeanization of strategies. The quantity of such sentences as well as the ‘intensity’ of the link established have been used for the estimation. Thus, for example, the N-VA’s, 2010 manifesto, which placed state reform fully within a European dimension and included sentences such as ‘Vlaanderen als lidstaat van de Europese Unie biedt het beste perspectief om een doeltreffend en democratisch zelfbestuur te organiseren in een snel veranderende wereld’<sup>6</sup> (N-VA, 2010, p. 9) has been coded 1; the 1991 VU’s manifesto that had a section headlined *Vlaanderen in Europa* and called for Flanders to be ‘een deelstaat van een confederatie die nu nog Belgisch is, maar straks Europees’<sup>7</sup> (VU, 1991, p. 2) but put slightly less emphasis on ‘Europe’ overall has been coded 0.8; while the 1968 VU’s manifesto, which devoted a section to the *Europa der volkeren*<sup>8</sup> and argued that ‘Het federalisme is geen ghetto: het sluit aan bij de federalistische stromingen in Europa en de wereld’<sup>9</sup> (VU, 1968b, p. 6) has been coded 0.6. Once estimated, both conditions and outcome have been assigned scores in six-value fuzzy sets (Ragin, 2008, pp. 30–33), as set out in the Appendix (Table A2). The manifestos for the first three elections were collected by the Manifesto Research Group (Budge *et al*, 2001) and supplied by GESIS,<sup>10</sup> the manifestos for the 2010 election and the other documents were collected/accessed by the author. Which configurations of conditions are connected with Europeanization have been identified with the help of fsQCA 2.5 (Ragin *et al*, 2006), a recently developed software producing fuzzy-set ‘truth tables’ linking conditions and outcomes and performing minimization analysis producing



complex, parsimonious and intermediate ‘solutions’, that is configurations of conditions connected with the outcome (Ragin, 2008, pp. 124–144).

## Results

### Descriptive results – Outcome

At T1 exploitation of the European dimension was uneven across parties. The CVP, the PSC and the PSB made no connections between the European dimension and state reform in Belgium. The PLP (1968a, p. 19; 1968b, p. 7; 1969) made some use of ‘Europe’ to undermine calls for the federalization of Belgium on the grounds that the latter would be a divisive form of federalism and would run counter to the ethos of European integration. The RW (1968, p. 6; 1969, p. 4) placed its call for Wallonia’s autonomy within a European context but did not significantly exploit the latter to strengthen its demand. The VU’s strategy was the most Europeanized, making considerable use of the European dimension to buttress the case for federalism in Belgium (VU, 1968b, pp. 6, 12, 15–16; 1970b; 1970c, pp. 3, 6; Menu, 1994a, p. 104).<sup>11</sup>

Strategic use of the European dimension was even more uneven at T2 and was confined to the Flemish parties. The CVP, the PSC, the PS, the PVV/VLD and the PRL made no connections between ‘Europe’ and state reform in Belgium. The VB (1991, p. 2) did place Flanders’ independence within the EU context but made virtually no effort to exploit such context to strengthen the case for it. The SP did not make strong links between the two but it did argue that integration was making further redistribution of responsibilities between the regions, the state and the Union necessary but, at the same time, it was also rendering independence outdated (Menu, 1994b, pp. 479–480). The party thus used the European dimension to strengthen its federalist position and to undermine the case for independence. The VU intensified its exploitation of the European dimension, arguing that further transfers of power to the EU would make Belgium increasingly redundant and open the way to a confederal evolution of the country. This would be part of a Europe-wide struggle for less power for the states and more for both the regions and the EU (VU, 1991, p. 2; 1993, pp. 7, 9, 11).<sup>12</sup>

Even greater variation can be observed at T3 but broadly displaying the same pattern. No party apart from the two Flemish nationalist ones made any links between the European dimension and further state reform. The VB, again, stressed that an independent Flanders would be a member state of the European Union but did not significantly exploit the European dimension to bolster the case for independence (VB, 2010, pp. 6–7, 47–48). In stark contrast, but in line with previous choices, the N-VA ‘played the European card’ to the

**Table 2:** Europeanization

	<i>T1 (1968)</i>	<i>T2 (1991)</i>	<i>T3 (2010)</i>
CVP/CD&V	0	0	0
PSC/CDH	0	0	0
PSB	0	—	—
SP/SP.A	—	0.4	0
PS	—	0	0
PLP	0.2	—	—
PVV/VLD/O_VLD	—	0	0
PRL/MR	—	0	0
VU/N-VA	0.6	0.8	1
VB	—	0.2	0.2
RW	0.4	—	—
<i>Index</i> <sup>a</sup>	<i>0.20</i>	<i>0.17</i>	<i>0.15</i>

<sup>a</sup>Calculated by adding the individual party scores and dividing the total by the number of parties.

full, making the changing context of an integrating Europe the cornerstone of its strategy and the key reason for Flanders to become, after a transitional confederal phase, an independent member state of the EU (N-VA, 2010, pp. 5–10, 64–70).<sup>13</sup> Table 2 summarizes these results.

### Descriptive results – Conditions

Party system status (C1):<sup>14</sup> at T1 the CVP and the PSC were together the largest ‘party family’ and were virtually indispensable in any governing coalition (Lamberts, 2004, p. 80). The PSB was the second largest party and a regular participant in coalitions but with a less central position in the system. The PLP was the traditional third party and had participated in fewer coalitions so had a more marginal system position. The VU and the RW were outsider parties with a radical constitutional agenda and were largely considered ‘uncoalitionable’ (Dewachter *et al.*, 1977, p. 250).<sup>15</sup> At T2, the CVP, the PSC, the PS and the SP maintained their positions while the PVV and the PRL became slightly more central. The VU had twice been in government in the intervening period so it was by then a fully coalitionable partner, albeit a weakened one (Deschouwer, 1999, p. 103). The major systemic difference was the presence of the VB, which was seen as totally uncoalitionable by the other parties due to its extreme right platform (CRISP, 1992, pp. 34–5).<sup>16</sup> At T3 the convention of ‘symmetrical’ coalitions – that is, with parties of the same ideological orientation being in government or in opposition together – had come to an end, bringing about a marginalization of the CDH and the SP.A.



The O\_VLD and the MR were also in a slightly weakened position whereas the N-VA was in the ascendancy.<sup>17</sup>

Absolute constitutional position (C2): at T1 the CVP and the PSB supported the introduction of forms of regional autonomy but rejected federalism (CVP, 1968, pp. 34–35; PSB, 1968, pp. 3, 8; Menu, 1994b, pp. 161–162). The PLP (1968a, pp. 10–11, 17–18, 47–50, 62–63) and, less strongly so, the PSC (1968, pp. 26–27) defended the constitutional *status quo* while the VU and the RW (VU, 1968a, p. 68; 1968b, p. 13; 1970a, p. 4; 1970c, p. 3; Menu, 1994a, p. 86; RW, 1968, p. 6; 1969, p. 4) called for Belgium to become a federal state.<sup>18</sup> At T2 all the traditional parties clustered together in support of a completion of the reform process with the achievement of a federal state, with only marginal differences between them (CVP, 1991, pp. 2–3, 9–10; PRL, 1991, pp. 10, 15; PS, 1991, pp. 2–3; PSC, 1991, p. 1; PVV, 1991, pp. 2, 6–7; VLD, 1992, pp. 1–2; Menu, 1994b, pp. 479–480). The VU (1991, pp. 1–3; 1993, pp. 11, 13) shifted its position to a ‘confederal’ model within which Flanders would acquire sovereignty and almost complete policy-making and fiscal autonomy, subject only to minimal standards set at the Belgian – and, later, the European – level. The VB (1991, pp. 2–4) wanted Flanders to become an independent republic with Brussels as its capital.<sup>19</sup> Further polarization can be observed at T3, when the CD&V (2010, pp. 42–44) and the O\_VLD (2010, pp. 29–35) put forward a confederalist position and the N-VA (2010, pp. 8–10, 64–70) adopted an ultimately independentist one, while the SP.A (2010, pp. 40–41) and the French-speaking parties (CDH, 2010, pp. 2–3, 6–10; MR, 2010, pp. 128–129; PS, 2010, p. 146) defended the federal *status quo* and the VB (2010, pp. 3–7) maintained its previous position.<sup>20</sup>

Relative constitutional position (C3): at T1 the *status quo* was a fully centralized unitary state (hence coded 0), at T2 it was a regionalized unitary state (coded 0.4) and at T3 it was a federal state (coded 0.6).<sup>21</sup>

Importance of the constitutional question (C4): at T1 the constitutional question was paramount for the VU and the RW and was of considerable importance to both the CVP, which had long been the primary political vehicle of Flemings’ demands, and, especially, the PLP, which had made the defence of a unitary Belgium a key plank of its platform. It was of less importance for the PSB, which was divided on the issue (Deschouwer, 2009, pp. 75–93), and to the PSC.<sup>22</sup> Broadly the same pattern can be found at T2, save in the case of the PS, which was by then the main voice of Wallonia’s autonomy demands, and of the two liberal parties, for which it was no longer a key issue. The constitutional question was also important for the VB but less so than for the VU as the former had decided to prioritize its extreme-right agenda.<sup>23</sup> The established pattern remained stable at T3 save for the CDH, whose president made the championing of Francophones’ rights a key element of the party’s platform (coded 0.6).

Depth of integration (C5): at T1 the EU was governed by the Paris and Rome treaties hence C5 is coded 0.2; at T2 the EU adopted the Maastricht treaty so the code is 0.6; at T3 the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force so integration is coded 0.8.

Attitudes to integration (C6): at T1 all parties were strongly in favour of European integration (CVP, 1968, pp. 29–30; PLP, 1968a, p. 59; PSB, 1968, p. 10; PSC, 1968, pp. 14, 33; VU, 1968b, pp. 15–16; RW, 1969, p. 4). At T2 the traditional parties maintained their positions (CVP, 1991, p. 16; PS, 1991, p. 47; PSC, 1991, pp. 2, 23; PVV, 1991, p. 8; Menu, 1994b, p. 483)<sup>24</sup> while reservations started to surface among Flemish nationalists. The VU (1991, pp. 3, 50–51; 1993, pp. 7, 9, 41, 50–52) was by then advocating a confederal rather than a federal Europe while the VB (1991, p. 10; 1993) expressed concerns regarding the homogenizing effects of Europeanization and called for a strict application of the subsidiarity principle. At T3 the cooling of attitudes had spread to the mainstream Flemish parties, who were still supporters of integration but had toned down their enthusiasm for a ‘United States of Europe’ (CD&V, 2010, pp. 63–64; O\_VLD, 2010, p. 60; SP.A, 2010, pp. 37–38), while the N-VA (2010, pp. 8–11) explicitly advocated a confederal Europe and the VB (2010, pp. 43–44) became markedly more critical. The French-speaking parties, in contrast, maintained their strong support for further integration along federalist lines (CDH, 2010, p. 38; MR, 2010, pp. 161–162; PS, 2010, pp. 156–159).<sup>25</sup>

Attitudes to the EU (C7): at T1 attitudes to the EU were perfectly in line with attitudes to integration for the traditional parties whereas they diverged in the case of the VU and the RW. While the former all supported the process of integration as then practised within the EU and saw a United States of Europe as the ultimate goal (CVP, 1968, pp. 29–30; PLP, 1968a, p. 59; PSB, 1968, p. 10; PSC, 1968, pp. 14, 33), the latter had a significantly different vision for a united Europe. The VU saw integration as a radical process of transformation leading to a federal *Europa der volkeren* whereas integration EU-style tended to underpin the traditional state order within which stateless nations such as Flanders were trapped (VU, 1968b, pp. 15–16; 1970c, pp. 3, 6; Menu, 1994a, p. 104). The RW also supported the idea of a Europe of the Regions but gave it a primarily economic, as opposed to ethnic, connotation and saw it more as a natural evolution of integration than a radical break with the existing state order (RW, 1969, p. 4).<sup>26</sup> At T2 there was still perfect alignment for the CVP, the PSC, the PVV/VLD, and the PRL but the SP (2010, pp. 37–38) and, to a lesser extent, the PS (1991, pp. 47–48) were critical of the weakness of the ‘social dimension’ of the EU under the Maastricht treaty. Nonetheless, all six parties supported ratification of the treaty (Deschouwer and Van Assche, 2008, p. 79). The Flemish nationalists, in contrast, had grown increasingly critical of the path taken by the EU – arguing that ‘Maastricht’ would make the EU even more ‘arrogant’ and technocratic



and take it further away from their ideal of a *Europa der volkeren* – and voted against ratification of the treaty in parliament (VB, 1991, p. 10; VU, 1991, pp. 3, 50–51; 1993, pp. 7, 9, 41, 50–52; Deschouwer and Van Assche, 2008, p. 80).<sup>27</sup> At T3 the Flemish nationalists abandoned the ideal of a *Europa der volkeren* thus bringing attitudes to integration and attitudes to the EU virtually in line across the board. All parties save the VB were positive towards the EU and supported ratification of the Lisbon treaty (Kamer, 2008, esp. 87; CDH, 2010, p. 38; CD&V, 2010, pp. 63–64; MR, 2010, pp. 161–162; N-VA, 2010, pp. 8–11; O\_VLD, 2010, p. 60; PS, 2010, pp. 156–159; SP.A, 2010, pp. 37–38; VB, 2010, pp. 43–44).<sup>28</sup> Table 3 summarizes these results as fuzzy-set scores.

### Fuzzy-set configurational analysis

In order to perform the fuzzy-set configurational analysis, the scores in Table 3 have been organized into a truth table (Table A3). On the basis of a frequency

**Table 3:** Fuzzy-set scores

	<i>C1</i> <i>sysstat</i>	<i>C2</i> <i>acopos</i>	<i>C3</i> <i>recopos</i>	<i>C4</i> <i>impcos</i>	<i>C5</i> <i>integ</i>	<i>C6</i> <i>attint</i>	<i>C7</i> <i>atteu</i>	<i>Outcome</i> <i>europ</i>
CVP 1	1	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.2	1	1	0
PSC 1	1	0	0	0.4	0.2	1	1	0
PSB 1	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	1	1	0
PLP 1	0.6	0	0	0.8	0.2	1	1	0.2
VU 1	0.2	0.6	0.6	1	0.2	1	0.4	0.6
RW 1	0.2	0.6	0.6	1	0.2	1	0.6	0.4
CVP 2	1	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.6	1	1	0
PSC 2	1	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.6	1	1	0
SP 2	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.6	1	0.6	0.4
PS 2	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.6	1	0.8	0
PVV 2	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.6	1	1	0
PRL 2	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.6	1	1	0
VU 2	0.4	0.8	0.4	1	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.8
VB 2	0	1	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.2
CD&V 3	1	0.8	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.8	1	0
CDH 3	0.6	0.6	0	0.6	0.8	1	1	0
SP.A 3	0.6	0.6	0	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.8	0
PS 3	1	0.6	0	0.6	0.8	1	0.8	0
O_VLD 3	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.8	1	0
MR 3	0.6	0.6	0	0.4	0.8	1	1	0
N-VA 3	0.6	1	0.4	1	0.8	0.8	0.8	1
VB 3	0	1	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.2

threshold of 1 and a consistency threshold of 0.80, the minimization procedure performed by the software produces the following complex solution (Table A4):

$\sim \text{sysstat} * \text{acopos} * \text{recopos} * \text{impcon} * \sim \text{integ} * \text{attint} * \sim \text{atteu} \rightarrow \text{europ}$   
(coverage : 0.578947; consistency : 0.846154)

The solution shows that the outcome is connected to the following configuration of conditions: low membership in party system status ( $\sim \text{sysstat}$ ); high membership in high demand for autonomy, radical constitutional positions and high importance of the constitutional question ( $\text{acopos}$ ,  $\text{recopos}$ ,  $\text{impcon}$ ); low membership in integration ( $\sim \text{integ}$ ), high membership in positive attitudes to integration ( $\text{attint}$ ); and low membership in positive attitudes to the EU ( $\sim \text{atteu}$ ).

The consistency figure indicates that the solution is sufficient to produce the outcome in 84 per cent of the cases (see also Figure A1). In other words, the solution is almost always sufficient to produce the outcome. Of the individual conditions, *impcon* is necessary (Figure A2) while *acopos* and *attint* are almost always necessary (Figures A3 and A4). The coverage figure indicates that the solution covers about 58 per cent of the cases. The relatively low coverage and the fact that high membership in the outcome ( $>0.5$ ) is present in only three cases suggest that one must be cautious in drawing conclusions from these results and that a more fine-grained analysis of the special case of the VU/N-VA is needed. This is developed in the following section.

## Discussion

Three main points emerge from the results presented above. First, most of the Belgian parties have exploited the European dimension in their rhetorical strategies on state reform to a limited extent only. In just eight cases out of the 22 analysed can some degree of linking be observed. Several parties, notably the Christian-democrats, have never linked the European dimension to state reform. Moreover, even when a link was made, the intensity of ‘exploitation’ tended to be weak. In five of the eight cases of linking, the fuzzy-set score is below 0.5. This is somewhat surprising in light of the theoretical literature suggesting that European integration fuels domestic processes of devolution of power but is in line with previous findings showing that the Belgian polity has been less Europeanized in general than what one might expect (for example, Bursens, 2002).

Even more surprising is the second main point. Contrary to the hypothesis that Europeanization would increase over time as integration deepened, the Belgian parties’ propensity to exploit the European dimension actually marginally declined from 1968 to 2010: the aggregate index score is 0.20 for



T1 and 0.15 for T3. This finding can likely be explained by the fact that the prospect of an integrated Europe – such as the ideal of a *Europa der volkeren* – has been equally important as the actual existence of the EU in providing a European dimension to state reform that parties could exploit to their advantage, hence they could appeal to ‘Europe’ even when integration was limited. On the other hand, in the case of the VU/N-VA, discussed below, strategic use has increased over time in line with integration. These contrasting trends seem to indicate that the deepening of integration *per se* does not make the strategic use of ‘Europe’ relevant to a party but may intensify it if a party is already likely to include the European dimension in its strategy.

Moving from aggregate patterns to key cases leads us to the third main point: the major exception represented by the VU/N-VA. The party has been the only one to adopt a ‘Europe’-exploiting strategy to a significant extent, corresponding to a fuzzy-set score above 0.5. The European dimension has clearly been an important feature of its strategy: the VU/N-VA has consistently ‘played the European card’ arguing that integration both facilitates the emergence of a Flemish polity – initially as a federated unit within Belgium and subsequently as an independent state – and makes it more necessary and urgent. Bucking the general trend, moreover, it has done so with increasing intensity over time. The combination of three key conditions seems to be able to explain the party’s exceptionalism: (a) its high demand for autonomy; (b) the paramount importance of the constitutional question for the party; and (c) its positive attitudes to integration. The VU/N-VA has likely seen using ‘Europe’ as an effective strategy to add pressure on the mainstream parties and achieve the constitutional goals at the heart of its *raison d’être*. In this case the deepening of integration has probably intensified its commitment to such a strategy especially as it has gradually moved from a federalist to an independentist position. The European dimension looms naturally larger over the prospect of independence as membership of the EU for an independent Flemish state would be an essential aspect of the latter’s viability. In the case of the VB, in contrast, which has also had high autonomy demands, its greater focus on extreme-right issues as opposed to state reform at T2, and its increasingly negative attitudes to both the EU and integration at T3 seem to account for the fact that it made little use of the European dimension. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the mainstream parties – insiders, moderate in their positions and less focused on state reform – likely had no incentives to Europeanize their strategies. The major exception of the VU/N-VA matters because, though rarely in office at the state level, it has exercised considerable competitive pressure on the mainstream parties and effectively won the ‘policy battle’ (Newman, 1995) on state reform. Even more importantly, in the wake of the 2010 election in which it exploited the European dimension to the greatest extent ever, it has become the largest party in Flanders and a pivotal player in

any future reform of the state. Although the VU/N-VA has been largely isolated in its strategy, through it the European dimension has had a non-negligible influence on the politics of state reform in Belgium. De Bandt's (1992, p. 136) conclusion therefore needs to be reassessed.

To what extent can these findings be generalized beyond the Belgian case? While further comparative research – especially cross-state – is clearly needed to validate them, three inferences suggest themselves. First, that the politics of state reform appears to be much more insulated from the European dimension than the theoretical literature suggest. As explained in the first part of the article, both the Belgian case and the three time points have been selected on the grounds that they maximized the chances of observing a Europeanization effect. Hence, if even in Belgium and even at particular critical junctures we can only observe limited linkage between 'Europe' and domestic change, it seems warranted to expect that the other major cases of state reform would have been even less influenced by the European dimension. In turn, this would then suggest that most of the political dynamic producing state reform is of domestic origin and the European dimension only has a 'punctuated' influence. Second, that Europeanization is not necessarily a 'linear' product of integration so that the former increases as the latter deepens. This case shows that Europeanization is determined in a complex way through the interaction of a number of factors. In order to fully understand such interaction, distinguishing between the ideational and the actual dimensions of integration and, in a related manner, between attitudes to integration and attitudes to the EU seems particularly important. As they reveal properties of Europeanization that do not appear Belgium-specific, in all likelihood these inferences have wider applicability beyond the case analysed here. Third, that significant exploitation of the European dimension may be a strategy only employed by regional-nationalist parties, provided they have positive attitudes to integration. The degree to which the politics of state reform is influenced by 'Europe' would thus depend on the role such parties play within it. The Belgian case shows that this can be important even if it is indirect and evidence from other cases such as the United Kingdom (for example, Dardanelli, 2009) points in the same direction. There is here an opportunity for the growing literature on regionalist/regional-nationalist parties and European integration, which has hitherto mainly confined itself to studying attitudes, to shed light on this aspect by also focussing on whether and how attitudes translate into strategies on state reform.

## Conclusions

The Belgian parties have exploited the European dimension in their rhetorical strategies on state reform to a limited but not negligible extent. While most of



them have consistently paid little attention to the connections between the two, the VU/N-VA has always exploited it and has done so to an increasing extent over time. No single ‘condition’ is sufficient to account for these patterns, although a configuration centred on constitutional position, importance of the constitutional question and attitudes to integration comes close to being able to do so. The VU/N-VA stands out because it has been the only party consistently displaying this configuration of conditions. Given the important role it has played, if the assumption that party strategies ultimately shape institutional change is valid, we can conclude that European integration has had a small but significant influence on the politics of state reform in Belgium. As the N-VA is now the largest party in Flanders, moreover, such influence may become even greater in the near future.

Drawing general inferences from the Belgian case, these findings confirm some results of previous research but also highlight rather surprising and counter-intuitive connections between European integration and the politics of state reform that are likely to apply to other cases as well. They suggest, in particular, that state reform is much more insulated from the European dimension than it is often claimed, that Europeanization is not a ‘linear’ product of integration, and that regional-nationalist parties play a key role. The Belgian case thus calls for a deeper theorization of how ‘Europe’ affects this aspect of domestic politics and suggests promising avenues for further comparative research.

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## Notes

- 1 'We want to be Flemings in order to become Europeans' (Vermeulen, 1951 [1900], p. 170).
- 2 The N-VA is the official successor of the VU, dissolved in 2001, and occupies roughly the same space within the Belgian/Flemish party system. It should be borne in mind, though, that the two parties are also significantly different in several respects (Govaert, 2002).
- 3 While Belgium's broad pro-integration consensus can be seen as reducing the saliency of 'Europe' as an issue of party competition (for example, Lynch, 1996, p. 133), it could be expected to induce the Europeanization of the politics of state reform because appeals to the European dimension would provide an external legitimation that carries a positive value in Belgian politics.
- 4 European Union and EU are used here also to refer to the European Communities before 1993.
- 5 The Green parties have not been included because they have been active only since the early 1990s.
- 6 'Flanders as a member state of the European Union offers the best prospects for effective and democratic self-government in a rapidly changing world'.
- 7 'A federated state of a confederation which currently is still Belgian but will be European'.
- 8 The phrase is of difficult translation. Literally, it means 'Europe of the peoples', understood primarily as national communities bound by language and culture rather than state institutions. It can thus be seen as a variant of the 'Europe of the Regions' idea, but with emphasis placed on ethno-cultural as opposed to economic aspects.
- 9 'Federalism is not a ghetto: it is linked to the federalist trends in Europe and the world'.
- 10 <http://www.gesis.org/en/services/>. The Party Manifestos were made available in electronic form through a joint effort between the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA), Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU) and the Party Manifestoes Project. MS Word transcription were made available by Paul Pennings and Hans Keman, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Comparative Electronic Manifestos Project, in cooperation with the Social Science Research Centre Berlin (Andrea Volkens, Hans-Dieter Klingemann) the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, GESIS, Universität zu Köln, and the Manifesto Research Group (chairman: Ian Budge). Financed by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO project 480-42-005).
- 11 CVP 1, PSC 1 and PSB 1 are thus coded 0, PLP 1 is coded 0.2, RW 1 is coded 0.4, and VU 1 is coded 0.6.
- 12 All parties are thus coded 0 apart from VB 2, coded 0.2, SP 2, coded 0.4, and VU 2, coded 0.8.
- 13 All parties coded 0, apart from VB 3, coded 0.2, and N-VA 3, coded 1.
- 14 For an overview of the evolution of the electoral strength of the parties, see Deschouwer (2009, ch. 5).
- 15 CVP 1 and PSC 1 are coded 1, PSB 1 is coded 0.8, PLP 1 is coded 0.6, and VU 1 and RW 1 are coded 0.2.
- 16 The codes are 1 for CVP 2 and PSC 2; 0.8 for PS 2, SP 2, PVV 2 and PRL 2; 0.4 for VU 2; and 0 for VB 2.
- 17 The June 2010 election is taken as the end of T3 so the major re-alignment in the party system that was produced by the election results is excluded from the analysis. All parties are coded 0.6 apart from CD&V 3 and PS 3, coded 1, and VB 3, coded 0.



- 18 CVP 1 and PSB 1 are coded 0.4; VU 1 and RW 1 are coded 0.6; and PLP 1 and PSC 1 are coded 0.
- 19 All parties are coded 0.6, apart from VU 2, coded 0.8, and VB 2, coded 1.
- 20 CD&V 3 and O\_VLD 3 are coded 0.8; N-VA 3 and VB 3 are coded 1; and the other parties are coded 0.6.
- 21 Codes are as follows: PLP 1, PSC 1 = 0; CVP 1, PSB 1 = 0.4; VU 1 = 0.6; CVP 2, PSC 2, PS 2, SP 2, PVV 2, PRL 2 = 0.2; VU 2 = 0.4; VB 2 = 0.6; PS 3, CDH 3, MR 3, SP.A 3 = 0; CD&V 3, O\_VLD 3 = 0.2; N-VA 3, VB 3 = 0.4.
- 22 VU 1 and RW 1 are coded 1; PLP 1 is coded 0.8; CVP 1 is coded 0.6; and PSB 1 and PSC 1 are coded 0.4.
- 23 VU 2 is coded 1, VB 2 is coded 0.8; CVP 2 and PS 2 are coded 0.6; and the other parties are coded 0.4.
- 24 The PRL manifesto did not take position on European integration but the party was generally in favour of it and supported ratification of the Maastricht treaty (Rudd, 1988, pp. 205–206; Deschouwer and Van Assche, 2008, p. 79).
- 25 All parties are coded 1 apart from VU 2, CD&V 3, SP.A 3, and O\_VLD 3, coded 0.8; VB 2, coded 0.6, and VB 3, coded 0.4.
- 26 The traditional parties are coded 1 while VU 1 is coded 0.4 and RW 1 is coded 0.6.
- 27 The Christian-democrat and the liberal parties are thus coded 1, PS 3 is coded 0.8, SP 3 is coded 0.6, and VU 3 and VB 3 are coded 0.2.
- 28 The Christian-democrats and the liberals are coded 1; the socialists and the N-VA are coded 0.8, and the VB is coded 0.2.

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## Appendix

**Table A1:** Party codes

- T1: *Christelijke Volkspartij* (Flemish Christian-democratic) [coded CVP 1], *Parti Social chrétien* (French-speaking Christian-democratic) [PSC 1], *Parti socialiste belge/Belgische Socialistische Partij* (socialist) [PSB 1], *Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès/Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang* (liberal) [PLP 1], *Volksunie* (Flemish nationalist) [VU 1], *Rassemblement wallon* (Walloon regionalist) [RW 1].
- T2: *Christelijke Volkspartij* (Flemish Christian-democratic) [CVP 2], *Parti Social chrétien* (French-speaking Christian-democratic) [PSC 2], *Socialistische Partij* (Flemish socialist) [SP 2], *Parti socialiste* (French-speaking socialist) [PS 2], *Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang/Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten*<sup>a</sup> (Flemish liberal) [PVV 2], *Parti réformateur libéral* (French-speaking liberal) [PRL 2], *Volksunie* (Flemish moderate nationalist) [VU 2], *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish radical nationalist) [VB 2].
- T3: *Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams* (Flemish Christian-democrat) [CD&V 3], *Centre démocrate humaniste* (French-speaking centrist) [CDH 3], *Socialisten en Progressieven – Anders* (Flemish socialist) [SP.A 3], *Parti socialiste* [PS 3], *Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten* (Flemish liberal) [O\_VLD 3], *Mouvement réformateur* (French-speaking liberal) [MR 3], *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* (Flemish moderate nationalist) [N-VA 3], *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish radical nationalist) [VB 3].

<sup>a</sup>The party changed its name in 1992

**Table A2:** Fuzzy-set scores for outcome and conditions*Outcome**Europeanization (europ):*

- 0 = no use of the European dimension in relation to state reform
- 0.2 = some marginal use
- 0.4 = moderate use
- 0.6 = significant use
- 0.8 = intense use
- 1 = European dimension 'placed at centre stage'

*Conditions**C1: Party system status (sysstat):*

- 0 = definitely non-coalitionable
- 0.2 = very unlikely to be included in a governing coalition
- 0.4 = unlikely to be included in a governing coalition
- 0.6 = likely to be included in a governing coalition
- 0.8 = very likely to be included in a governing coalition
- 1 = virtually certain to be included in a governing coalition

*C2: Absolute constitutional position (acopos):*

- 0 = full centralisation
- 0.2 = some autonomy
- 0.4 = stronger autonomy/regionalisation
- 0.6 = federalism
- 0.8 = confederalism
- 1 = fully independent statehood

*C3: Relative constitutional position (recopos):*

- 0 = same as the *status quo*
- 0.2 = 1 value from the *status quo*
- 0.4 = 2 values from the *status quo*
- 0.6 = 3 values from the *status quo*
- 0.8 = 4 values from the *status quo*
- 1 = 5 values from the *status quo*

*C4: Importance of constitutional question (impecon):*

- 0 = not important
- 0.2 = marginally important
- 0.4 = moderately important
- 0.6 = quite important
- 0.8 = very important
- 1 = the most important

*C5: Depth of integration (integ):*

- 0 = no integration
- 0.2 = Paris and Rome treaties
- 0.4 = Single European Act
- 0.6 = Maastricht treaty
- 0.8 = Lisbon treaty
- 1 = federal Union

*C6: Attitudes to integration (attint):*

- 0 = total rejection of integration
- 0.2 = strong opposition to integration

**Table A2** *continued*

0.4 = mostly critical of integration  
 0.6 = supportive of integration with some reservations  
 0.8 = strong support for integration  
 1 = enthusiastic support for integration  
 C7: *Attitudes to the EU* (atteu):  
 0 = support for withdrawal from the EU  
 0.2 = opposition to ratification of a treaty  
 0.4 = mostly critical  
 0.6 = mostly positive with some reservations  
 0.8 = strongly positive  
 1 = enthusiastic

**Table A3:** Truth table

<i>C1</i>	<i>C2</i>	<i>C3</i>	<i>C4</i>	<i>C5</i>	<i>C6</i>	<i>C7</i>	<i>europ</i>	<i>Raw const.</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Cases</i>
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.846154	1	VU1
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0.692308	1	[VU2]
0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0.666667	1	VB2
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0.6	1	RW1
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0.5	1	VB3
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.216216	6	CVP2, PS2, CD&V3, CDH3, PS3, [N-VA3]
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.193548	2	CVP1, PLP1
1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.111111	2	PSB1, PSC1
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.060606	7	PSC2, SP2, PVV2, PRL2, SP.A3, O_VLD3, MR3

*Note:* borrowing the terminology and the notation from Vis (Vis, Barbara. 2011. Under which conditions does spending on active labor market policies increase? An fsQCA analysis of 53 governments between 1985 and 2003. *European Political Science Review* 3/2: 229–52, Table A2.), ‘deviant’ cases, that is those with high (>0.5) membership in the outcome but a configuration of conditions below the consistency threshold, are shown in square brackets

**Table A4:** – fsQCA 2.5 output

\*Truth table analysis\*

File: F:/AP/AP 2.2 data.csv

Model: europ = f(sysstat, acopos, recopos, impcon, integ, attint, atteu)

Rows: 9

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1

*Complex solution*

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.846154

	<i>Raw coverage</i>	<i>Unique coverage</i>	<i>Consistency</i>
~ sysstat*acopos*recopos*impcon* ~ integ*attint* ~ atteu	0.578947	0.578947	0.846154
solution coverage: 0.578947			
solution consistency: 0.846154			

\*Truth table analysis\*

File: F:/AP/AP 2.2 data.csv

Model: europ = f(sysstat, acopos, recopos, impcon, integ, attint, atteu)

Rows: 9

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1-L

*Parsimonious solution*

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.846154

	<i>Raw coverage</i>	<i>Unique coverage</i>	<i>Consistency</i>
~ integ* ~ atteu	0.631579	0.631579	0.750000
solution coverage: 0.631579			
solution consistency: 0.750000			

\*TRUTH table analysis\*

File: F:/AP/AP 2.2 data.csv

Model: europ = f(atteu, attint, integ, impcon, recopos, acopos, sysstat)

Rows: 1

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1

0 Matrix: 0L

Don't care: -



Table A4 continued

## Intermediate solution

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.846154

Assumptions:

attint (present)

impcon (present)

recopos (present)

acopos (present)

~sysstat (absent)

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~atteu*attint*~integ*impcon*recopos*acopos*~sysstat	0.578947	0.578947	0.846154
solution coverage: 0.578947			
solution consistency: 0.846154			

Table A5: Membership in solution and outcome

	~sysstat	acopos	recopos	impcon	~integ	attint	~atteu	Memb. solution	Memb. outcome
CVP 1	0	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.8	1	0	0	0
PSC 1	0	0	0	0.4	0.8	1	0	0	0
PSB 1	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.8	1	0	0	0
PLP 1	0.4	0	0	0.8	0.8	1	0	0	0.2
VU 1	0.8	0.6	0.6	1	0.8	1	0.6	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.6</b>
RW 1	0.8	0.6	0.6	1	0.8	1	0.4	0.4	0.4
CVP 2	0	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.4	1	0	0	0
PSC 2	0	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4	1	0	0	0
SP 2	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4	1	0.4	0.2	0.4
PS 2	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.4	1	0.2	0.2	0
PVV 2	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4	1	0	0	0
PRL 2	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.4	1	0	0	0
VU 2	0.6	0.8	0.4	1	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.4	<b>0.8</b>
VB 2	1	1	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.2
CD&V 3	0	0.8	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.8	0	0	0
CDH 3	0.4	0.6	0	0.6	0.2	1	0	0	0
SP.A 3	0.4	0.6	0	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.2	0	0
PS 3	0	0.6	0	0.6	0.2	1	0.2	0	0
O_VLD 3	0.4	0.8	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.8	0	0	0
MR 3	0.4	0.6	0	0.4	0.2	1	0	0	0
N-VA 3	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.2	<b>1</b>
VB 3	1	1	0.4	0.8	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.2	0.2




Figure A1: Plot of membership in the outcome against membership in the solution.




Figure A2: Plot of membership in the outcome against membership in *impcon*.




Figure A3: Plot of membership in the outcome against membership in *acopos*.




Figure A4: Plot of membership in the outcome against membership in *attint*.